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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents three essays in the field of empirical industrial organiza-
tion, with a particular focus on the retailer market for liquor in Iowa. This
work is divided into three chapters, with each focusing on a different aspect
of retailer decision making and purchasing behavior.
The first chapter presents new findings on the impact of retailer licensing
fees on market structure and provision of services in market equilibrium for
bottled liquor in Iowa. By utilizing a unique variable fee schedule with a
large recurring license fee, Iowa provides an opportunity for determining the
effects of licensing fees on market outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity
approach, this paper finds no effect on the number of retailers operating, but
provides some weak evidence for an increase in the volume sold per store.
Two key implications follow. First, even relatively large regulatory burdens
on retailers have a low impact on business outcomes. Second, increasing
license fees is an inefficient way of restricting alcohol consumption. These
findings suggest that higher per-volume taxes on liquor may not be a good
policy for reducing alcohol consumption and abuse. We recommend future
work to address the potential management structure effects of licensing fee
regimes.
The second chapter investigates relatively novel techniques for demand es-
timation. Random forest regression is quite new to economics, but is very
established as a predictive tool in other disciplines. Random forest regression
is better able to capture high-level interactions and nonlinearities than most
other estimation techniques, but is limited in its ability to be interpreted.
Here we apply this technique to a unique dataset of liquor sales in the state
of Iowa to estimate demand among retailers for the top-selling liquor prod-
ucts. We observe much more accurate predictions from the random forest
model given the same datasets, but random forest regression exhibits a few
undesirable properties regarding error distribution.
ii
The final chapter focuses on the assortment decision faced by liquor retail-
ers. Any retailer selling highly-diversified, imperfectly substitutable products
must contend with difficult assortment selection decisions. Retailer assort-
ment decisions depend on complex, interdependent cost and revenue func-
tions along with strategic considerations regarding the assortment decisions
of competitors or potential market entrants. This paper contributes a novel
identification strategy to generate reduced-form estimates for the effects of
competitor assortment decisions among liquor retailers in Iowa. We find that,
overall, retailers try to match each other’s assortment strategies, but there
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CHAPTER 1
LIQUOR LICENSE FEES AS A




Liquor consumption has very high social costs that are not easily internalized
in a free-market setting (Sacks et al. 2010, Bouchery et al. 2006, Sacks et al.
2006). In particular, liquor consumption is associated with higher crime rates
(Fitterer & Nelson 2015), domestic abuse (Kyriacou et al. 1999), and poorer
public health and mortality, (Room, Babor, & Rhem 2005, Poikolanen 1994).
The typical mechanism proposed for internalizing these costs is the use of
per-unit-volume taxes on alcohol itself. These taxes are direct and sensible
from an economic standpoint, but there are two problems. The first problem
concerns the magnitude of the socially-optimal tax rate. This problem is
conceptually tractable but empirically difficult. Sacks et. al. (2010, 2006)
estimate a social cost per ”drink” somewhere between $1 and $2 US dol-
lars per drink depending on certain assumptions of the value of additional
life-years and the reduction in traffic deaths associated with lower alcohol
consumption. Pogue and Sgontz (1989) attempted to derive the socially op-
timal tax rate on alcohol. They provide a fairly wide range of estimates for
the optimal tax, but conclude that current taxes are clearly below that range.
This is especially troublesome because of the difficulty in predicting precisely
how increased excise taxes will be passed through to the consumer. It is not
obvious that a dollar passed on to the consumer has the same impact on
consumption as a dollar borne by the retailer or manufacturer.
The second problem is under appreciated and much more severe. In par-
ticular, it is politically very difficult to raise excise taxes. First, excise taxes
on alcohol are both regressive and subject to fierce opposition by a small
number of powerful, concentrated business interests. Second, alcohol taxes
are likely to be a highly controversial issue when discussed by legislatures at
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the state or federal level, because they impact directly consumers. This con-
troversy can translate into much more political pressure on legislators than
would be present if only one of the above effects were operating.
A similar political dynamic is present with other consumption taxes on
particular products, such as gasoline and tobacco. Excise taxes, though effi-
cient and economically attractive, are often difficult to implement in socially
efficient ways once the limitations of political economy are considered. For
example, in 2016 the state of New Jersey voted to raise their gasoline tax
for the first time in 28 years. During that time period, the real value of the
tax had fallen 51% and New Jersey infrastructure had been badly under-
funded. Still, the increase was subject to a heated debate and its passage
was not guaranteed. Thus, the policy maker must consider whether there is
a less economically efficient, but more politically feasible way to internalize
the social costs of liquor consumption.
Within the U.S. there is a wide variation across states in both the design
and strength of the regulatory regime governing the sale and consumption of
alcohol because of a relatively permissive federal regulatory structure. The
resulting variation of regulatory regimes allow the researcher to investigate
differing policies, frequently in a quasi-experimental setting. Regulations on
retailers are highly variable and provide a possible avenue for influencing
overall liquor consumption.
Nearly all states tax liquor above and beyond the normal state sales tax,
with most using a supplemental ad valorem tax. However, each state varies
considerably in how it regulates the businesses that provide liquor and as-
sesses additional fees. This variation is sometimes covered in the so-called
blue laws that govern sales in many states (e.g. Sunday sales restrictions),
and is often tailored to local market realities. For example, Virginia charges
a completely separate liquor license fee for gourmet oyster houses.
Additionally, a handful of states exert some degree of direct control over
sales and distribution of alcohol. These so-called control states dictate prod-
uct prices and availability to consumers, to widely varying degrees. This
regulation takes many forms, but the case of Iowa is straightforward. Iowa
controls all importation and distribution of liquors above a certain alcoholic
content. Control states can be excellent environments for economic study
because of the high degree of data availability and because of the uniform
treatment across specific vendors within a diverse set of local markets.
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1.1.1 Iowa Liquor Importation, Distribution, and Licensing
for Sale
In the state of Iowa, it is illegal for any private business or person to import
liquor from outside the state for resale. Private businesses must acquire their
stock from state warehouses. Retailers in the state include liquor stores,
convenience stores, and grocery stores. These can be multinational chains or
local, single-location businesses. In all cases, it is illegal to purchase liquor
produced outside the borders of Iowa for resale.
There are 6 liquor distillers located within Iowa, but they collectively pro-
duce an extremely small volume of local brands, and by themselves cannot
support a strong, independent distribution operation. In practice this means
all liquor for most retailers comes from state distributors.
The government of Iowa also sets the wholesale prices for liquor sold
through the state distributor. By law, the prices are set to a markup of
50% above the price paid by the state to manufacturers.
Iowa does not charge an additional sales tax on liquor as other states
do, but rather treats the 50% markup from the manufacturer’s price as a
liquor tax. Functionally, this leaves Iowa with relatively high taxes on liquor,
though the direct comparison with most state’s per-unit-volume taxes is dif-
ficult. Iowa’s 50% markup is larger than what would be expected of a private
wholesaler. However, compared to a hypothetical alternative scenario with
private distribution and a liquor-specific sales tax the overall cost to retailers
is equivalent or lower depending on assumptions of the relative size of the
liquor-specific sales tax (Iowa ABD 2009).
Iowa also has a unique retail licensing structure. There is an annual fee
which varies based on the size of the city a in which a retailer operates (or
the closest city if the retailer is not within city limits). The fee is quite
high (minimum at $750, and maximum at $7,500 per year). For reference,
a retailer in Des Moines can rent a 1,500 square foot space for as little as
$11,250 per year, with lower prices found in other parts of the state. Table
A.1 below describes the license fee schedule based on retailer square footage
and city population as measured by the decennial census. There is a separate,
but similar schedule for retailers that also sell gasoline (Table A.2). Many
states charge license fees for any business that sells alcohol. In nearly every
case this fee is fixed across the state, and is typically less than $700 per year
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(many are merely $100).
There are three key features of the Iowa license fee that facilitate a quasi-
experimental approach. First, a liquor license holder cannot choose to locate
just outside the city limits in order to avoid paying a liquor license fee. By
law the fee charged in the nearest incorporated city is applied to any retailer
not technically within any city limits. In rare cases there might be a city a
sufficiently short distance away had a much smaller population, but to ”opt
out” of the population dimension of increasing license fees, a store would
have to make a fairly substantial relocation toward a smaller city.
Second, the thresholds for increasing fees as population increases do not
vary with square footage. It is plausible that retailers will design their foot-
prints to remain below critical thresholds for the fee schedule. However,
even if they were to do so they would still be subject to the same or similar
increases in their fees as a city population increases.
Third, the square-footage of each retailer is recorded with the state, and
any modification to the store must be reported to the Iowa Alcoholic Bev-
erages Division. The square footage is also determined by the physical size
of a store, not by the square footage on which liquor is sold. For example, a
grocery store does not have a reduced square footage for licensing purposes
just because it has a small section of the store devoted to liquor sales. This
fee structure does not eliminate the potential for stores to reduce square
footage in response to city population changes, but doing so would require
at minimum expensive physical renovations.
1.2 Data
Our unit of analysis is the city-level market for liquor for each city in Iowa.
We aggregate all data to the city level, giving us a full set of total market
outcomes over four years for all cities in Iowa. City here is defined somewhat
broadly. Each retailer is assigned a city for reasons of assessing liquor license
fees, and all stores with the same city designation are considered part of that
city, even though potentially some retailers are not located strictly within
any particular city’s limits.
The data used for this paper are derived from the Iowa Alcoholic Bever-
ages Divisions records of sales dating back to 2012. This dataset provides
4
a complete listing of all liquor sales to any Class E liquor license holder.
A Class E license is required to resell bottled liquors purchased from the
state monopoly distributor and importer in Iowa. This information includes
the date of purchase, volume of purchase, price paid, and a description and
categorization of every product. The data also include information on each
license holder, including the address and other key characteristics.
These data can be easily aggregated to a city level (based on the definition
of ”city” above). For the entire period of study, several aggregate variables
are of interest: the number of stores that ordered liquor in each city in Iowa,
the amount of liquor sold in each city, and the different types of liquor.
Additionally, population data on each city were collected from the US Cen-
sus Bureau. This information describes, among other things, the population
of the city where each retailer operated (exclusive of any surrounding un-
incorporated areas). This allows us to determine the liquor license rate for
each store.
From this data we generate key variables to be used for this analysis. These
are variables represent market outcomes where we hypothesize an effect may
be observed due to higher liquor license fees.
Stores operating: Higher liquor license fees may cause some potential mar-
ket entrants to decline entry, because higher license fees would result in higher
annual fixed costs. There may exist marginal retailers where economic profit
drops below zero if a city is slightly larger than 1,500 people.
To construct this variable we count the number of stores associated with
each city in Iowa. Each licensee must list a city for fee-assessment purposes,
we aggregate store counts by these city designations. It is plausible that
some locations undergo changes in management or are sold multiple times,
so we consider unique addresses per city as well. Both formulations deliver
similar results because few store addresses are used repeatedly in Iowa cities
under 3,000 population.
Volume sold: Higher liquor license fees could result in less liquor sold if
stores choose to pass the higher fees through to consumers. This means that
the license fee operates in a similar to an additional liquor sales tax. The
literature suggests there is some pass-through of liquor sales taxes (Kenkel
2005, Ally 2014, Young & Bieliska-Kwapisz 2002) but there is no evidence
on pass-through of retail license fees. Unfortunately we do not observe the
prices actually charged by stores. However all else equal, higher prices should
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result in smaller volumes, and this should be detectable at the city-market
level.
Operation Time: Following similar logic to our store count variable, we
can define a ”store-day” as one day where one store was operating in a given
city in Iowa. The total number of store-days may be reduced with higher
liquor license fees through driving market exit, discouraging market entry,
or pushing the market equilibrium toward one with fewer, larger stores than
would be present in a lower liquor license fee environment.
Average Cost: Along with the typical variable costs, there are fixed costs
in stocking any given liquor product. These include allocation of shelf space,
advertising, label printing, and storage costs. Higher liquor license fees should
impact the selection offered at a retailer if the owners are capital constrained.
It is unclear in which direction we would expect this effect to work. Products
with lowest profitability would be dropped first, but they could be expensive
or cheap depending on the of local demand.
Product variety: There is evidence that the pass-through rate of taxes on
more expensive liquor products is higher (Ally 2014). As stated above, there
are fixed costs for choosing to carry a particular product, so a higher overall
fixed cost for the store could divert enough money to preclude the stocking
of marginal products.
Volume per store: The volume sold in a city divided by the store count
may be positively impacted by higher liquor license fees. Higher fixed costs
may force store owners to use their stores more intensely than they would
otherwise. This could lead to higher volume per store, even in the case where
the liquor license fees reduce the total volume in a city through fewer stores.
Volume intensity: Similar to volume per store, we may expect volume per
square foot of retail space to be positively affected by higher liquor license
fees.
Variety intensity: The number of different products offered per square
foot of city retail space may be affected even if overall product variety is not
affected. This follows logic similar to our analysis of volume per store, where
we may expect variety intensity to rise even as overall city product variety
falls.
Mean chain size: The average size of the chain retailers are members of
in each city. This is meant to capture differences in management structure
due to a larger corporate organization backing given retailers. Retailers are
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assigned a chain code based on retailer name and ownership information.
We then count the number of establishments these different chains operate
in Iowa (independent stores are assigned a value of one).
Multi-City Chain Share: The share of retailers in a given city that are a
part of chains that operate in multiple cities within Iowa.
Legally, there are two key thresholds: 1,500 and 10,000 population. How-
ever, Iowa is a small, rural state with relatively low population densities
throughout, so the number of cities close to the 10,000 population threshold
is actually quite low. Considering the sparse data around the 10,000 popu-
lation threshold, the focus of this analysis is on cities at or near 1,500 people
in population. These cities tend to be rural and fairly homogeneous, much
like the state of Iowa more broadly. A few are suburbs of larger metro areas,
particularly Des Moines, but most are relatively more isolated.
1.3 Methodology
The unique fee schedule used by Iowa to grant liquor licenses provides an
excellent opportunity to apply regression discontinuity as outlined by Lee
and Lemieux (2010).
If we consider $100 as the lower end of observed liquor license fees, we
first note that the treatment effect in this study is large: liquor license fees
in Iowa are up to 75 times larger than the same store would pay in many
other states. Several states have fees equivalent to Iowa’s, but few have fees
that are generally higher. 1 The differences between license fees for a city
population crossing above a critical threshold are on the order of 7-10 times
the total fee in some states, and about equal to the total fee in many others.
These fees are economically meaningful. As stated above, the lease for a
retail store can be as low as $11,000 per year, so an increase of just $750
represents a non-trivial increase in operating costs.
The goal of this paper is to assess whether or not these license fees are large
enough to have an appreciable impact on the liquor market. Fee changes
through the threshold are substantial by national standards.
A key assumption of regression discontinuity is that there can be no self-
1It should be noted that the assessment of a license fee tends to be controlled by very
particular legal exceptions and categories.
7
selection into treated or untreated groups. Stores obviously cannot manipu-
late the census count of individuals living in a city in order to remain below
a certain threshold. Stores can somewhat select into a city with a lower pop-
ulation, but because a store is always under the tax scheme of the nearest
city this choice is very much restricted assuming the store still wants access
to a particular city market. Again, Iowa is a rural state and the vast major-
ity of cities near the 1,500 population threshold are relatively isolated. Des
Moines contains several lower-population suburbs, but the results are not
appreciably changed by the inclusion or exclusion of these cities.
Other city characteristics do not vary through the threshold, with one
caveat. The characteristics of Iowa cities on either side of the 1,500 popu-
lation threshold are not meaningfully different. However, very few cities in
Iowa actually cross the 10,000 population threshold, so this margin is not an-
alyzed. Furthermore, we do not include cities above 3,000 population in the
analysis. The relatively few cities with populations larger than 3,000 have
excessive leverage on the parametric estimates of the treatment effect. Given
that we have fairly little guidance on the expected relationship between pop-
ulation and several of our margins, it would be imprudent to include high
leverage points so far from the threshold.
For this set of cities, the average store is subject to an increase in liquor
license fees of $1,404 when a city grows to 1,500 or more in population. This
value will be used to calculate the local average treatment effect of a higher
liquor license fee.
1.3.1 Non-Parametric Models
Parametric models can provide accurate estimates of treatment effects under
certain circumstances, but are typically quite sensitive to the specification
and model selection choices on the part of the researcher. A more robust
method is to use a two-sided local linear regression, especially in an en-
vironment with low a priori information on the exact shape of underlying
relationships.
Local linear regression fits a polynomial of defined degree to the data using
weighted least squares. Here we use the quadratic, as suggested by Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). For this analysis the weights for each point
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are Gaussian, with a bandwidth defining the degree to which weights fall as
we move further and further from the particular point under consideration.
When we say ”two-sided,” we mean that on each side of the 1,500 popula-
tion threshold, we fit a different local polynomial regression. Then by com-
paring the difference in estimates at the boundary we achieve an estimate of
the treatment effect on a particular margin from higher liquor license fees.
For each margin of interest, confidence intervals were generated using a
bootstrapping procedure. The data were randomly sampled with replace-
ment 1000 times for each margin, and a local polynomial regression was fit
for each sample. Following this, confidence intervals were generated using
the relevant quantiles from the estimated local polynomials.
This procedure as applied to regression discontinuity designs was first sug-
gested by Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw (2001) because it provides better
behavior in estimates at the boundary relative to kernel density estimation.
Since the boundary is precisely where we are searching for the best possible
estimates, this is a critical choice for ensuring accuracy while minimizing
variance.
One key drawback of local polynomial regression is that its estimates are
quite sensitive to the selection of bandwidth (Fan 1992). If the bandwidth is
too narrow (meaning we only use information very close to a given x value to
fit the curve) we obtain an estimate with extremely high variance and poor
out-of-sample properties. For too wide a bandwidth (especially those that
approach the OLS case of full weighting for all points), we generate estimates
that over-smooth important features of the data, and end up with likely bias
in the estimate of the treatment effect.
Fortunately, there are several ways to generate bandwidths that balance
this trade off in a robust way determined entirely by the characteristics of the
data. For each variable of interest, we used the plug-in bandwidth selection
method described by Ruppert, Sheather, and Wand (1995) was used. The
bandwidths used for each regression are listed in Table A.4 in the appendix.
1.3.2 Fully Parametric Models
Regression discontinuity analyses can be sensitive to the selection of a func-
tional form. Still, many papers take an aggressive approach with sparse
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data and fit fully parametric models using indicator variables for the treat-
ment. This can be a reasonable approach when the relationship between
the treatment-assignment variable and the outcome of interest is well under-
stood.. Here, as in many actual cases, we have little clear guidance on this
relationship for several of our margins of interest. This suggests OLS is not
an optimal strategy, but we include it here to demonstrate the inadequacy
of this approach. Higher-degree polynomials, though likely to be misleading,
are still quite common in regression discontinuity papers and are sometimes
used to draw unwarranted conclusions.
We take as our predictor the city population and its transformations. For
OLS models we also include an indicator for a city population greater than
1,500 along with an interaction between that variable and the population to
allow for different slopes and maximum flexibility.
For each margin we investigate several functional forms of OLS regression.
These include linear, quadratic, cubic functions of population, and the same
including an interaction terms for each polynomial degree.
The count of stores operating in each city is generally small, so we also
investigate several well-established discrete models for this margin. In par-
ticular, we examine ordered probit, Poisson, and negative binomial. These
models are all explored using the same functional forms as for OLS. Our pre-
ferred model, the Poisson, is discussed below. Results for the other models
are not reported, but are available on request.
1.4 Results
Overall, results suggest a possible increase in the intensity of use among
stores, but without any particularly significant differences in net market out-
comes. These results are suggested by the local polynomial regressions, but
are much harder to determine using only fully-parametric models due to a
high degree of sensitivity to specification.
1.4.1 Non-Parametric Models
We begin by analyzing the results obtained using local polynomial regression.
Results are presented in figures A.9 through A.16.
10
Store counts do not seem to increase or decrease as a result of higher
liquor license fees: the local polynomial estimates an increase of 0.39 stores
on average, but this is far from significant.
The results are similar for operation time and average cost. We found no
cases do we observe a significant change.
We also observe no appreciable change in chain size or the share of chains
participating in multiple markets. These estimates are quite noisy, however.
However, there is some evidence that volume and volume per store actually
increase. In the case of volume, the median estimated increase per city over
the four studied years (2012 through 2015) is 53,264 liters, but the 95%
confidence interval is quite wide, suggesting this increase is not significant.
For volume per store we estimate an increase of 20,680 liters per store over the
four years (or 3.7 liters per dollar of additional fee). Again, the confidence
interval is quite wide, but in this case seems to be significant at the 10%
level. Examining the graph we observe a rapid decrease in volume per store
as population increases further beyond 1,500. This would be consistent with
an effect concentrated at the threshold.
The increase in volume per store implies that the higher liquor license
fees push stores to use their spaces more intensely than they would other-
wise. This increase in intensity of use is possibly large enough to increase
the amount of liquor sold overall, though the estimates of overall volume
increase are quite noisy and not statistically significant at the 5% level. The
conclusion is not much clearer when looking at per capita volume (Figure
A.31), but again is gently suggestive of an increase in volume on either side
of the threshold.
We also observe an increase in item variety when crossing the threshold.
This can again signal a higher intensity of use in the market. Increasing
variety would be consistent with stores diversifying to better serve higher-
margin niche customers.
Overall, these results suggest that increasing license fees do not affect the
number of stores selling liquor in a given city. However, they do provide some
weak evidence consistent with an increase in the intensity of use of each store
to cover higher license fees.
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1.4.2 Parametric Models
In this section we detail the results from using more parametric models.
For most specifications the best-fit model is a full-cubic with interaction
terms between crossing the threshold and the quadratic and cubic terms.
Specific results are listed in tables A.7 through A.15. Figures A.1 through
A.8 chart the various parametric models that were fit to highlight the relative
divergence in estimates and overall sensitivity to functional form.
For store count we observe the OLS model gives inconsistent estimates of
the effect of crossing the threshold. Estimates are very sensitive to the spec-
ification, and range from positive to negative. The model with the greatest
explanatory power, the cubic-with-interactions model, suggests a small, neg-
ative, but insignificant difference in store counts per city when crossing the
1,500 population threshold.
The discrete model largely repeats this pattern. A Poisson regression sug-
gests varying estimates of the effect of crossing the 1,500 population thresh-
old. We find both positive and negative coefficients in the models with the
best fit.
We thus have an indication that the true difference is near zero. By plot-
ting these models we can obtain a visual sense of this. The magnitude of
the shift is quite sensitive to the slope estimated on either side of the thresh-
old. We can test the robustness of these results by varying the threshold
artificially. This is accomplished by changing the indicator variable from in-
dicating population over 1,500 people to 1,400, 1,600, and other numbers.
When we vary the threshold artificially, we observe similar estimates. These
results are available on request.
Our most preferred model indicates an increase of about 4,000 liters of
liquor over the course of the four years. However, this estimate is insignifi-
cant, even though individually the relevant coefficients are significant.
The number of store-days observed in each city is also quite sensitive to
specification. Our most preferred model suggests an imprecisely estimated
decrease, but some specifications suggest significant increases. Examining
the plots of the various specifications we again note the apparent sensitivity
to small changes in the slope on either side of the threshold.
Most of the models estimate a slight drop in average cost of goods pur-
chased through the threshold, but this effect is insignificant in all models,
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including our preferred specification. Furthermore these models have fairly
low F-statistics, suggesting weak explanatory power.
Item variety and volume per store seem to increase slightly through the
threshold, but this increase is insignificant.
Other margins (variety intensity, volume intensity) generate inconsistent
estimates, so firm conclusions cannot be drawn. In all instances the F-
statistics were insignificant, and these models are not reported.
In order to drive home the apparent lack of impact of a large increase
in annual licensing fees in Iowa on most margins, we also re-estimate the
OLS models using a varying threshold. Instead of indicating population
over 1500, we vary the indicator to code population from 1,000 to 2,000 by
steps of 100 people. We observe remarkably similar estimates regardless of
which indicator is used for all margins, except for item variety and volume
per store. In the latter two cases we observe a sharp shift in the parameter
estimate on either side of the threshold. This demonstrates a certain degree
of robustness regarding these two margins, while indicating that the true
effects are likely quite close to zero for other margins . The estimates for
overall city volume also shift on either side of the true threshold, but this
shift is much less pronounced. For brevity these results are omitted but are
available on request.
These results are all robust to the inclusion/exclusion of cities located
within the Des Moines metropolitan area.
1.4.3 Robustness to Pooling
As a robustness check, we re-estimate all non-parametric models pooling data
on either side of the threshold. These results are presented in figures A.21
through A.30. We find the results to be largely similar, and the narrower
confidence reinforce our findings on volume and volume per store. They do




Iowa provides a strong test case for the efficacy of increasing liquor license
fees in altering local alcohol markets. Fees are high relative to other states
and the schedule is such that there is large exogenous variance in the fee paid
by a given retailer based on city population.
We also observe a certain ambiguity in the expected true relationship be-
tween the assignment variable (city population) and the various market mar-
gins of interest. Thus, we are also given an excellent opportunity to compare
methods that are robust to specification error to those that are not.
By examining the data using locally-weighted quadratic functions, we find
some evidence of an increase in the volume of liquor sold per store and an
increase in item variety. This seems to translate to a very slightly higher
volume overall in a given city, though the estimate is quite noisy. We find no
other significantly affected margins. This is consistent with stores increasing
the intensity of their use of space when subjected to higher liquor license
fees, but only slightly.
Comparing these results to those obtained with OLS (which remains quite
popular in regression discontinuity analyses) we observe a high degree of sen-
sitivity to specification in the estimates. We present evidence that strongly
suggests less thorough research could easily draw unsubstantiated conclu-
sions from improperly specified models. This is unlikely to be an issue when
the shape of a given underlying relationship is well-understood. However in
cases where there is significant ambiguity, OLS is a risky technique, even
when using polynomials and interaction effects.
Overall, we detect effects in only a few variables, and these were quite
small in magnitude. If policy makers want to use fees on retailers to reduce
or control alcohol consumption because of their smaller political costs or
to dilute political costs over several policies, these results suggest fees or
penalties would have to be extremely high. For the time period covered in
this research, the increase in fees for city populations over 1,500 is minimally
$750 and maximally $1,500. These are very large increases relative to even
the base cost of a liquor license in other states.
That the volume effect is not apparently attributable to any other de-
tectable changes in store composition or product availability suggests po-
tentially hidden effects on store management practices resulting from higher
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liquor license fees. Future work investigating the effect of regulatory frame-
works and licensing fees on management practices and store operation will
likely provide interesting findings.
Though it is important to consider the impact of less-efficient policy inter-
ventions if they are politically more palatable, this work suggests they will








Retailers operating in any market do so under the physical restrictions of their
premises. This problem is especially acute for non-online retailers. Storing
inventory and maintaining a diverse product selection is itself costly, in both
labor, capital (shelves, floor space, storage space), and strategic complexity
in the form of higher-dimensional decision and information requirements. In
most cases, only a relatively small fraction of all possible products a retailer
could stock are actually stocked at any given time because of cost and space
restrictions. Furthermore, retailers can and do update their stocks based
on local market realities by purchasing new products or discarding products
that perform poorly, resulting in a constantly-updating strategy over time.
This process does not occur within each retailer in isolation. Retailers in all
markets are strategic actors, and consider the assortment strategies of nearby
competing retailers or potential market entrants in making their own stocking
decisions (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2009) and even use relative market
power as a factor in setting an assortment strategy. Dukes, Geylani, and
Srinivasan (2009) demonstrate that large retailers in many markets come
to dominate the specific demand for high-demand products, and essentially
force smaller retailers to adjust their assortments toward products with lower
demand. This is in addition to the normal price competition already present
in the retail space.
The problem of assortment selection is a complex one, far more complex
than a joint pricing decision. The joint pricing decision for any set of N goods
occurs over at most N dimensions (the prices to charge for each good). As-
sortment, meanwhile, covers many more dimensions. Not only must price
be taken into consideration, the retailer must also consider shelf space and
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facings (Hansen and Heinsbroek 1978), inventory (Urban 1998; Hariga, Al-
Ahmari, and Mohamed 2007), display space (Hariga, Al-Ahmari, and Mo-
hamed 2007) and a host of miscellaneous stocking constraints imposed by
individual manufacturers, local governments, and oftentimes corporate own-
ers.
Assortment itself can serve as an inducement to purchase or abstain from
purchase for individual customers above and beyond the attraction of par-
ticular products within that assortment. High amounts of variety may have
signaling value, and the literature suggests this signal is interpreted in com-
plex, potentially non-monotonic ways by consumers (Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and
McAlister 1998; Hoch, Bradlow, and Wansink 1999, Chernev and Hamilton
2009). Retailers have a strong incentive to solve for their optimal assortment
strategy.
Many potential solutions to the problem of assortment focus on linear
programming (Dobson and Kalish 1993, Chen et al. 1998) to find the profit-
optimal assortment strategy. The chief benefit of these approaches is the
ability to tackle the high-dimensionality of the assortment problem actually
present in the retail market. However, these approaches tend to ignore one
or more key dimensions of the problem (e.g. taking demand as exogenous,
ignoring cross-product substitution, or ignoring inventory space considera-
tions)
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992) take a more game-theoretic
approach to estimate an empirical model of firm entry and exit. Subsequent
work has focused on identification through theory as a major technique for
solving the firm entry problem. Notably this literature does not often discuss
assortment directly (with exceptions such as Mazzeo 2002 and Seim 2006),
but rather focuses on the entrance and exit of whole establishments offer-
ing a product that falls within a broadly substitutable category. The work
presented here helps to extend this empirical approach using an instrument
that holds the firms themselves constant and considers entry and exit into
the markets for specific products that could be offered by firms.
This paper contributes to this literature by first acknowledging the inherent
difficulty in describing a fully comprehensive theory supporting the totality
of the assortment problem 1. We then apply quasi-experimental methods to
1A nuanced overview of these issues is given by Kök, Fisher, and Vaidyanathan (2008).
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estimate the empirical sign and magnitude of strategic interaction between
retailers competing in the same market across many similar products. These
reduced-form estimates are better able to account for the complex interaction
between retailers without relying on numerous heroic assumptions that would
be required to make this problem tractable in a game-theoretic setting. We
are also able to avoid the reduction in problem dimension that is required by
linear programming approaches to attain the computational feasibility.
2.2 Data
We restrict our analysis to the strategic interaction between retailers of liquor
in the U.S. state of Iowa from 2012 through 2015. The market for liquor is
heterogeneous and highly fragmented. Several major categories of liquor
products are available at many different price levels, from high-end vodkas
and imported liqueurs to cheap whiskeys. Furthermore, Iowa is a largely
rural state with well-isolated local markets. There is a high degree of het-
erogeneity across markets in the ownership structure of local liquor retailers,
which supplies more identifying variation for our parameters of interest. Ad-
ditionally, we have access to a unique, rich dataset on individual retailer
transactions covering a very long panel period.
The data used for this paper are derived from the Iowa Alcoholic Beverages
Divisions records of sales covering the years 2012 through 2015. This dataset
provides a complete listing of all liquor sales to any liquor license holder in
Iowa. This information includes the date of purchase, volume of purchase,
price paid, and a description and categorization of every product. The data
also include information on each license holder, including the address and
other key characteristics. Iowa is a ”control state,” which in this case means,
legally, all imported liquor supply must be sourced from the state monopoly
distributor. In reality, Iowa has only four operating distilleries that produce
very small volumes of select products. Thus Iowa maintains a functional
monopoly on liquor wholesale to retailers. The sales records are a matter of
public revenue, and are thus publicly available by law.
We take as our unit of analysis the decision of a particular establishment
to order a particular liquor product from the state monopoly distributor at
least once in a given period (6 months by default, but we vary this as a
18
robustness check). For their most frequently-ordered items, establishments
may have multiple orders in a given month, but for less frequently-ordered
products several months may elapse before repurchase. Liquor has a long
shelf-life and most producers tolerate somewhat old stock on retailer shelves.
The retailers themselves do not have a strong incentive to keep stock very
fresh for most liquor categories, as liquor is not subject to spoilage (unlike
beer).
There are over 2,000 individual products offered by the state distributor
over the four years covered by our data. Therefore, market fragmentation is
high and for most products demand is low. For the purposes of this exercise,
we restrict analysis to those products with at least an overall volume share of
the market of 0.1%. This cutoff leaves us with 204 products covering nearly
all types of liquor sold by all major manufacturers. Predictions generated
from this dataset are at the retailer-product level 2.
We also have detailed data on each retailer operating in Iowa between 2012
and 2015. These data include address, ownership status and establishment
name. We also observe whether the retailer sells gasoline, the square-footage
of the retailer, and the type of establishment the retailer operates as (grocery,
convenience, liquor store, etc.). From these data we are able to derive a chain
classification for each establishment in Iowa (multi-city, single-city, number
of establishments in Iowa) and assign each establishment to a chain. This is
accomplished through cataloging common establishment names, owners, and
types. In practice there are almost no ambiguous cases, formal state records
make ownership structure very simple to parse. In many cases the ”chain” is
a single establishment operating in a single market. In only one case is there
a multi-market chain with a single establishment in Iowa (Save-a-lot).
We define local markets by the city identification associated with each
establishment. We consider an establishment to be ”within chain” for a
given establishment of interest if it has the same chain identity. Similarly we
consider an establishment to be ”within city” for a given establishment of
interest if they share the same city designation. Technically, chain retailers
can have establishments in multiple cities or single cities, but in practice
almost all have establishments competing in multiple city markets.
Using this classification it is straightforward to calculate the within-chain
2Note that actual establishment sales and prices to consumers are masked, here we
treat the retailer as the demand-side and the monopoly distributor as the supply-side.
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share of establishments that ordered a given product in a given time period
as well as the within-city count of establishments that ordered the product
for any given establishment of interest.
2.3 Identification Strategy
The complete information we have on the liquor market in Iowa gives us sev-
eral hundred markets all realized simultaneously under a very similar strategy
space. All establishments at any given point in time are given the same prod-
ucts to choose from and, importantly, pay the same price for each product.
Being in the same state, all markets are under nearly identical regulatory
frameworks but maintain heterogeneity that impacts local market demand.
For retailers whose co-owned establishments are all within the same mar-
ket (or who have no co-owned locations), stocking decisions at each retailer
must be totally responsive to local market demand. An individual establish-
ment’s incentives are all aligned with the goals of the overarching ownership
structure.
Consider a retail chain with identically or similarly branded establishments
extending across several heterogeneous markets. For a chain’s overarching
ownership, profits across all establishments are considered together.3 Overar-
ching ownership and management structures have an incentive to make sure
product selections are coordinated across establishments within the chain.
This ensures a consistent consumer experience across similarly branded es-
tablishments and allows for coordinated pricing and advertising strategies. It
also eases transfer of staff and training requirements across establishments.
It is very simple to show that a chain establishment’s stocking decisions
can be substantially different from the stocking decisions of the same estab-
lishments operating independently, so to support the identification strategy
we take a moment to demonstrate this explicitly. Consider a simple case of
two retailers, A and B operating in totally separated markets and considering
stocking a single product.
Let fj(Ij) be the net revenue function exclusive of fixed costs in the
local market equilibrium for establishment j ∈ {A,B}, with Ij = 1 if
3This holds even for franchises. For example, publicly-traded Casey’s General Store
computes quarterly profits by summing quarterly profits across all establishments.
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establishment j stocks the product, and Ij = 0 if establishment j does
not stock the product. Let each firm’s fixed cost for stocking the prod-
uct be represented by αj(Ij). This includes the cost of allocating shelf-space,
menu costs, labor costs, and establishment-brand adjustment costs. Suppose
fj, αj ≥ 0 and both are non-decreasing in their arguments. Further suppose
fj(0), αj(0) = 0. We wish to solve for the profit-optimal Ij for both A and
B.
We may write a profit function of the form:
πj = fj − αj (2.1)
A given establishment will only choose Ij = 1 when fj − αj ≥ 0.
Now we will demonstrate that even if both firms would be unprofitable
stocking the product individually, positive profits may be achievable under a
chained ownership structure. Suppose A and B are owned by the same firm,
with the firm’s overall profits being simply the pooled individual profits of A
and B. We assume the chained status of the establishments across markets
does not affect each establishment’s optimal pricing decisions or quantity
sold given a particular stocking decision, meaning fj(Ij) is not sensitive to
ownership structure.
This implies we may write
π(IA, IB) = fA(IA) + fB(IB)− α(IA, IB) (2.2)
as the joint profit function for the chained retailers, with joint fixed costs
α(IA, IB) that are not necessarily a function of αj(Ij). Suppose fj − αj < 0
for both A and B. Then it is easy to conclude
π(1, 1) > π(0, 0) iff α(1, 1) < fA(1) + fB(1) < αA(1) + αB(1) (2.3)
which is possible exactly when the total fixed costs of the chained estab-
lishments are strictly less than the total fixed costs of each establishment
operating individually, and fixed costs are nonzero. We can readily observe
that in cases where it would be profitable for one establishment to stock the
product anyway it may still be beneficial to the firm to force the other to
stock as well. Furthermore, with strong, but reasonable assumptions on the
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fixed-cost functions we can infer that the threshold at which a particular
establishment will stock a product falls as more establishments within the
same chain stock it.
Intuitively, a chain may have a profit incentive to stock retailers when there
is a fixed-cost savings to be gained from doing so. These savings may come in
the form of advertising, market research, or transportation and warehousing
savings. To show that the probability of a forced stocking decision rises
as the number of same-chain establishments stocking a product rises, we
require these sorts of effects to be present. This is a strong, but reasonable
assumption. Furthermore, this is directly testable in the data.
It can be shown that, even with fixed cost savings across establishments,
there are cases where a chained establishment will not stock a product that
would have been stocked by that establishment individually. This can occur
when the fixed costs for offering a product at a single establishment in the
chain are higher than the establishment would experience individually. This
could occur in cases where the costs of adjusting brand identity to consumers
is included in the fixed stocking costs, for example. We would expect such
costs to be very low for independent establishments, but potentially high for
chained establishments. It could also occur if distribution and shipping con-
tracts are negotiated in such a way as to force the chain to stock the product
at establishments where it would otherwise not be profitable. Frequently in
practice, franchise agreements mandate a certain selection homogeneity that
could serve as a mechanism for this sort of behavior.
The above logic only applies to establishments that operate as part of a
multi-market chain. Considering a single-establishment enterprise operating
in a single market, we wish to test whether or not firms react to the stocking
decisions of competing firms in making their own stocking decisions. How-
ever, the actual number of competitors stocking a given product in a given
time period is trivially endogenous.
We propose instrumenting for the number of competitors stocking a prod-
uct with the sum across chains (present in the local market) of the percent-
ages of establishments not located in the market within a given chain that also
chose to stock the product. We read in zeroes to the sum for single-market or
single-establishment competitors. By the logic of the preceding section, this
should be exogenous to the local market and satisfy the exclusion restriction.
Our model is exactly identified in this case, so we cannot test the exclusion
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restriction directly. The instrument should also be closely related to the total
number of competitors in the market that stock the product. This is directly
testable as the first stage of the regression.
This gives us a reaction function for establishment i operating in market
m considering product j in time period t:
yijt = α + βXijt + γ ∗N−ijt + ϵijt (2.4)
where yijt represents the decision to stock a particular product j by estab-
lishment i in time t. We assume the error terms, ϵijt, are IID normal. We
recognize N−ijt, the number of competitors of i (indexed by −i) choosing to
stock j in time t, is endogenous. We assume the set of additional regressors,
Xijt, is exogenous and can thus serve as its own set of instruments. Direct
estimation through either probit or OLS will thus be biased. We take as our
first stage
N−ijt = αf + βfXijt + δ ∗
∑
k∈K
(S−mjtk ∗ I{k ∈ Cmt}) + νijt (2.5)
We define Cmt to be the set of distinct multi-market chains operating in
city m at time t. We define S−mjtk, our instrument, as the sum over all multi-
market chains K of the percentage of within-chain establishments outside m
(−m) stocking j in time t.
The first stage estimates are used to instrument for the endogenous variable
in (4).
2.4 Methodology
To implement our identification strategy we use the IV Probit model first de-
scribed in Rivers and Vuong (1988). Estimation of this model proceeds using
a two-step procedure, the efficiency and large-sample properties of which were
established by Newey (1987). This method is appropriate for cases where the
model is just-identified (such as this one).
Estimation here proceeds by first performing linear regression on (5), then
using the estimated residuals as an explanatory variable in a subsequent pro-
bit. This probit is estimated using the usual method of maximum likelihood.
However, the restrictions on functional form assumed by the Rivers and
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Vuong model are well known, so we will also examine the results from a tra-
ditional two-stage least squares model (2SLS), a robustness check suggested
in Angrist and Krueger (2001).
Both estimation techniques are consistent in this application conditional
on the satisfaction of the exclusion restriction, but 2SLS is here interpreted
as a linear probability model. This leads to a few undesirable properties.
In particular there is a well-known tendency for linear probability models to
generate predictions outside the [0, 1] interval, and to be strongly influenced
by outliers.
We do estimate the models for data pooled across products, but this cer-
tainly masks considerable product-level heterogeneity. In particular we are
concerned with the heterogeneity across products in the estimates of the co-
efficient γ from the regression equation. We expect several products will have
positive γ, whereas others will have negative γ. Positive γ is associated with
a ”herding” strategy, where each additional competitor choosing to stock a
given product makes an establishment more likely to also incorporate that
product into their assortment. This could occur for a variety of reasons in-
cluding learning from competitors about the nature of demand for a product
and a need to maintain assortment parity with competitors 4. Negative γ
is associated with ”differentiation” or ”rivalrous” behavior, where establish-
ments are less willing or less able to compete for demand for a product given
entry into the market by a competitor. A mechanism for this behavior would
profit maximization coupled with crowding out.
Rather than estimate the full suite of interaction effects in a single equation
(giving several hundred additional coefficients) we estimate a single model
for each product. This makes the regressors in X related to each product
redundant with the intercept term, so they are dropped. We also drop price,
as for many (but not all) products price variation over the panel is low or
zero, precluding the estimation of price effects at the product-level.
4Chernev and Hamilton (2009) and Dukes, Geylani, and Srinivasan (2009) give some
indication that these types of consideration may be important drivers of firm behavior.
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2.5 Results
We begin by demonstrating that, for a multi-establishment chain, a higher-
share of within-chain establishments choosing to stock a given product is
associated with a greater probability of a given establishment stocking that
product. We regress an establishment’s decision to stock a particular product
on the share of that establishment’s own chain that chose to stock the same
product in the same period using OLS. For this regression we restrict the
sample to multi-city, multi-establishment chained retailers.
Strictly speaking, this is not the first-stage for the full model described in
(4) and (5), but rather an empirical test of whether or not chain stocking
decisions are correlated. This does not speak to the instrument’s validity, but
does give some indication of the instrument’s strength and helps to connect
our instrument to the model outlined in section 4.
Indeed we find a significant coefficient on the share of the own-chain es-
tablishments stocking a given product (Table B.1). This large, positive co-
efficient demonstrates that chained establishments have similar assortment
strategies.
Now we move to the first stage regressions across products. We find large
F-statistics for both the pooled model and for models estimated for each
product individually. This owes to both the strength of the instrument and
the richness of the data. In the overall model the F-statistic in the first-stage
is 2.02∗106, and the p-value for the Wald test is near zero. Furthermore,
the coefficient on the instrument is large and significant relative to other
predictors. It is also economically meaningful. With a value of about 1, we
can infer that there is a nearly one-for-one relationship between the share of
a chain outside a market ordering a product and an increase in the number
of establishments in the city ordering a product. These results are presented
in Table B.2.
For no individual product is the first-stage F-statistic less than 10, which
is a widely accepted threshold for a strong instrument. In fact all first stage
F-statistics are well over 200, and the Wald tests for each product-level model
are significant.
Given these results, we can infer that the instrument is strong. The deci-
sions of within-chain establishments outside a given market choosing to stock
a given product does have a significant impact on the number of establish-
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ments in a given city stocking a given product.
Now we move to the estimates of γ, the coefficient representing the size
and direction of the effect of competitor stocking decisions on retailer stock-
ing decisions. Main results are presented in Table B.3. For the main model
we first examine overall results pooled across all products. This model also
includes covariates describing key product features. We find a significant,
though small, coefficient γ for both the 2SLS and IV probit estimates. The
marginal effect of an additional establishment carrying each product are es-
timated to be 1.41 and 1.84 percentage points respectively. This means an
additional competing establishment choosing to carry an arbitrary product
increases the probability of ordering that product in the same six-month win-
dow by something less than 2%. This is a small, but significant effect. In
larger cities with more retailers this can result in a large shift in probability
when considering a shift in strategy across multiple retailers.
Summary results for the value of γ for individual-product models are pre-
sented in Table B.4, and full results for the subset of products with a market
share of at least 0.5% in Table 5. Recall these models do not include product-
level covariates as they would be perfectly co-linear with the intercept term.
We observe that at the individual product level most γ coefficients are below
zero, indicating rivalrous demand is the norm for most products, which for
a significant subset of products we observe positive γ. We can conclude het-
erogeneity across products is extensive, especially regarding the interaction
between store-level variables and particular products.
Both the 2SLS and IV probit models tend to agree on coefficient magni-
tude and sign. Correlation across all products for γ is 0.59. The 2SLS model
is linear in probability, and excluding two cases where effect sizes outside
the unit interval were estimated we find effect estimates ranging from −0.12
to 0.05. The median effect size across products for this model was −0.002.
The probit model reports z-scores and the net marginal effect of an addi-
tional establishment choosing to carry a particular product is dependent on
all coefficients in the model. Calculating these marginal effects across the
sample we observe effect size ranging from −0.16 to 0.05. The median effect
across products for this model was −0.001. Effect sizes across the models
are displayed in Figure B.1.
This finding is consistent with rivalrous product demand in local markets
being slightly more decisive in stocking decisions than any benefits to the
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retailer more broadly from harmonizing offerings across establishments and
reducing customer uncertainty. Other effects may be present, but it is clear
that the division of demand across multiple retailers is a key motivating
factor. We do not observe that the size or sign of the coefficient is related to
sales volume of the products (Figures B.2 and B.3).
2.5.1 Goodness of Fit
We can also gauge goodness-of-fit for these models by examining the share of
”correctly predicted” ordering decisions, using 50% as the prediction cutoff.
We do this by generating a hit rate, which is simply the share of ordering
decisions predicted that actually correspond with the true ordering decision.
The hit rates for each model are comparable and high. The 2SLS specification
has a hit rate of 65.8%, while the IV probit model has a hit rate of 65.9%.
We observe that, at the product level, the IV probit model does a slightly
better job fitting the data than the 2SLS model (Figure B.4).
We can also examine the ”confusion matrix” for both models, which gives
us a sense of the absolute number of predictive successes and failures. We
present these results in Table B.6. We observe a slightly higher proportion
of non-purchase results predicted correctly, and a higher share of overall
non-purchase observations in the data. The results are similar across model
types.
When we re-compute the confusion matrix using only observations for
which a prediction of purchase above 80% (classified as a prediction of pur-
chase) and below 20% (classified as a prediction of non-purchase), we observe
much higher accuracy rates, and an overall accuracy rate of 86.2% for the IV
probit model and 78.1% for the 2SLS model (Table B.7).
2.5.2 Robustness to Market Definition
For robustness we also consider different time-horizons. In addition to defin-
ing participation in the market for a particular product as making an order
in a six-month window, we consider 12-month, 9-month, and 3-month win-
dows. Seasonal effects may be present in the demand for some goods, and by
examining the 12-month effects in particular we can obtain a sense of their
27
magnitude. We do not have enough data to estimate product-level seasonal
effects.
We observe remarkable stability in the overall estimate of the marginal
effects of the participation of an additional retailer in the market to variance
in the specific definition of a market. The coefficients and marginal effects
are all quite close to each other in magnitude and sign. Results are somewhat
different for the 3-month definition, but the other estimates are very highly
correlated. These results are reported in Table B.8.
At the product level the specific marginal effects vary considerably when
we vary the definition of market participation. This variation has roots in
potential behavior changes with differences in market definition. As the
definition of market participation becomes narrower (moving from 12 months
to 3 months) the observed participation of a given establishment depends
more and more on the storage capacity and decisions of individual retailers.
This information is unobserved, but is a potentially large source of noise. In
any case we would expect the relative sign of the effect to remain somewhat
stable to changes in definition, and in our case it does. We observe in figures
B.5 through B.7 these effects as they change through definitions. We note
moderate changes in the 12-month model, indicating weak seasonal effects
(at least regarding the ability of demand at one retailer to influence demand
at another).
2.5.3 Heterogeneity in γ
We also investigate the magnitude of the coefficients when we restrict analysis
to markets with a smaller number of retailers (four or fewer, the median
value). When we do this we observe much larger, more positive coefficients γ.
The increase in size is expected, but the shift toward more positive coefficients
suggests a complex level of strategic interaction at the retailer level. It is
entirely possible less information about local market demand is available in
markets with fewer retailers, so a competitor choosing to order a product is
taken to be a stronger signal. We note the F-statistics for these models are
all still quite large.
These results are presented in Table B.9. These results are pooled across
products, and from them we can infer that the effect of competing retailer’s
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stocking decisions is much larger in markets with fewer retailers. This is in
line with what we would expect. With fewer competitors, we would expect
retailers in smaller markets to respond more aggressively to the decisions of
individual market participants.
We regress the γ coefficients on variables for product-specific characteris-
tics to further explore potential heterogeneity in the coefficient. We find few
consistent effects, though it appears certain categories of alcohol have higher
γ coefficients, as well as very large bottles (though this effect is imprecisely
estimated). These results are presented in Table B.10.
2.5.4 Location-Specific Heterogeneity
Implicit in the argument for the validity of our instrument is an assumption
that chained retailers do not select into markets predisposed to demanding
the products in which they specialize. If this occurs, an increase in the
instrument is indirectly correlated with local market demand through this
selection effect. We should then observe more positive γ coefficients than we
would otherwise across affected products.
It is not immediately obvious this is an extremely problematic issue. Liquor
store chains may not specialize or gain a reputation for stocking particular
products, categories, or brands. We would anticipate most of this specializa-
tion occurring among local retailers, which are not included in the construc-
tion of the instrument.
We can test the impact of this by controlling for the share of various
categories of liquor local markets end up demanding. This is accomplished
through dividing all products into categories based on liquor type (vodka,
rum, etc.) and price level (by price tercile). This variable should be tightly
related to the (unobservable) liquor taste heterogeneity across markets. If
the effect of this omitted variable bias is large we should see a large shift in
our estimates of γ. We also include city-level income as measured by the US
Census Bureau.
When re-estimating our model we observe shifts in the marginal effects in
the predicted negative directions. However the shifts are relatively small in
magnitude. This suggests some small degree of endogeneity may be present
that biases the estimates of γ upward. We do not, however, have evidence
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that this effect is particularly strong, and the change in results does not
substantially alter the conclusions of this work.
A comparison of the marginal effects across these models can be found in
figures B.8 and B.9. We observe a few large shifts (the x-axis corresponds
to the marginal effects excluding location-specific variables. The plots are
broadly similar, with most coefficients being close to equal for both models,
suggesting the endogeneity bias from chain location selection predicated on
local taste is likely not severe.
2.5.5 Excluding High Purchase Ratio Products
We can re-estimate the pooled model excluding products with an overall
observed purchase ratio above a certain threshold Including these products
may be raising the estimated γ coefficient of the pooled model. We specify
the purchase ratio as the total share of all observations for a given product
where a purchase actually occurred in the data. We then estimate the pooled
model using only products whose purchase ratio falls below a given threshold.
Using a variety of thresholds we indeed find the estimate of γ rises with
the exclusion threshold for both estimation techniques, but the overall model
never achieves a negative marginal effect in any case tested (Table B.11). We
can infer that high purchase ratio only affects the overall results to a small
degree, reinforcing the conclusion that significant product-level heterogeneity
reduces the usefulness of a model pooled across products. We can infer the
usefulness of techniques in the literature that force aggregation of results at
the product level should be viewed with extreme caution.
Looking at the product level results we do observe a small positive as-
sociation between purchase ratio and γ. However, this effect is quite small
(Figures B.10 and B.11), and not consistent enough to suggest that higher
purchase ratios drive higher estimates of γ.
2.6 Discussion
We have demonstrated in this paper that there is wide heterogeneity across
products in retailer strategic responses to competitor stocking decisions. For
many products there appears to be a modest incentive to stock a product
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when a competitor chooses to do so. This could be consistent with firms
learning about demand from the decisions of other firms or from incentives
around attracting and maintaining a consumer base. For many other prod-
ucts there is a modest disincentive to stock a product when another firm does
so, which is consistent with a limited, rivalrous demand or rapidly diminish-
ing returns to firm entry.
Much future work on assortment decisions and strategic behavior could
flow from these results. Learning precisely why firms make these decisions
would require a much richer theoretical background supported by data on
retailer sales to consumers. This work helps to inform what effects we should
expect to see on net from models that tackle more specific, isolated segments
of this problem. The practical applications of this work are clear, in that the
actual solutions to these very high-dimensional assortment problems may
exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity across very similar products.
We have suggestive evidence that chained establishments may have re-
duced costs of stocking a product across multiple establishments than those
establishments would have in total individually. This is an important ques-
tion to address more fully. In particular identifying the mechanism through
which this effect operates could help differentiate differences in strategies
across chained and non-chained retailers.
Though our identification strategy is able to determine this in a reduced
form equation, this work could be extended to a testable formal model of
retailer stocking decisions in a multiple-retailer environment. This model
would help to explain why we see so little evidence of retailers herding toward
a common subset of all possible products.
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CHAPTER 3
A RANDOM FOREST APPROACH TO
DEMAND ESTIMATION
3.1 Introduction
Demand prediction remains a classic problem in empirical economics. Mul-
tiple approaches are typically applied for a given application. Models lever-
aging aggregate data are often employed to generate estimates of overall in-
dustry demand. Models leveraging less aggregated data are also estimated,
often using discrete choice methodologies, to generate less aggregated results
(either at the product-level or customer-level). In many cases, models are
evaluated based on both predictive accuracy and theoretical validity.
The differences between these approaches are non-trivial from the per-
spective of policymakers. As governments change their approach to alcohol
regulation they must consider the revenue and economic implications of mod-
ified policy. One notable recent example is alcohol deregulation in the state
of Washington, which dismantled a state-run liquor distribution apparatus
in 2012. How this move impacted demand, and the effects of the subsequent
necessary shift in tax policy on state revenues, are questions of paramount
importance. Differences in predictions stemming from demand models are
critical in understanding the range of potential outcomes following a large
policy shift.
Discrete choice models based on individual purchase histories or simulated
individual purchase histories remain very popular within economics. The
Berry Levinsohn Pakes model in particular is powerful when using aggre-
gated, market level data on many continuously differentiated products. Cars
(Berry 1994) and breakfast cereal (Nevo 2001) are classic examples of applied
work in this field.
In industrial applications, a popular approach is to fit simpler multinomial
logit, nested logit, or mixed logit to sales data to build a predictive demand
32
model. This is usually a result of a lack of good instruments for price. 1 These
models are estimated using either disaggregated purchase history data or
experimentally collected revealed preference data. In the latter case, an entire
industry has sprung up focusing on what is called ”conjoint analysis,” which
has broad appeal in industries where price experimentation is impossible and
historical price data are lacking in good instruments.
Industrial organization techniques such as multinomial logit (McFadden
1974), the method of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004), and conjoint anal-
ysis all focus on fitting utility functions for each product in the relevant
market. From this, the models provide probabilistic estimates of purchase
for each product by individuals or groups using a linking function between
the utilities and probability. Typical choices are type-I extreme value (known
as logit) 2 and the normal distribution (known as probit). Changes in the
probabilities in response to changes in underlying variables (such as price)
can provide predictions of both quantity demanded and demand elasticities
with respect to a wide variety of covariates.
However, these models tend to forgo a focus on predictive accuracy in favor
of isolating specific elasticities or causal parameters. Prediction of demand
is itself an interesting problem, and many techniques outside the economics
literature could be usefully applied.
In particular, prediction methods from the field of data science have been
successful applied to a wide variety of problems including biology (Shipp et al.
2001) and sociology (Jones et al. 2013). The term ”big data” is frequently
applied to this field of research, but it is truly a misnomer. Data science
methods tend to make use of a larger numbers of predictors than methods
from other disciplines, but they do not necessarily use more observations.
The methods are usually quite simple to implement and are very flexible,
but tend to sacrifice some interpretability in order to achieve a higher level
of performance.
One method borrowed from data science leverages what are known as ar-
tificial neural networks. This method involves generating a graph connecting
inputs (data) and outputs (a prediction). Estimation proceeds by strength-
1The main differentiation between different industrial applications is in estimation tech-
nique: Bayesian Markov-chain Monte Carlo or maximum likelihood.
2Which is advantageous because it gives a closed functional form solution to estimated
probabilities.
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ening edges that lead to an improved prediction and weakening edges that
lead to a less accurate prediction. This process is intended to mimic the way
the human brain learns. These models tend to be extremely hard to imple-
ment and tune. They provide very little in the way of interpretability, and
their performance in predicting continuous variables is not well-understood.
Still, they remain very accurate when tuned properly and not overloaded
with a large number of predictors.
Another, simpler method known as decision trees (pioneered by Breiman
(1984)) utilizes simple averaging and partitions to generate predictions and
classifications. A decision tree makes partitions of the dataset based on the
values of explanatory variables. The partitions are generated recursively and
by discrete notes in such a way as to minimize the variation in the variable
to be predicted in each subset. Each partition is generated by splitting the
data on the variable and value resulting in largest improvement. Partitioning
continues until a pre-determined stopping point, typically some threshold
of improvement from taking an additional partition. Decision trees can be
useful in simple contexts, but have a strong tendency to over-fit the data
(Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman 2009). They also generally display poor
out-of-sample properties, so are best-suited to consistent processes such as
industrial production quality control.
Random forest is arguably the most widely-implemented data science method-
ology in existence. The key feature of random forest is to take decision trees
and vastly reduce their tendency to over-fit the data by fitting many slightly
different decision trees. Each tree is fit on a bootstrapped sample from the
data using a random subset of predictors at each node. Aggregating the pre-
dictions of many trees gives the final prediction. This method is applicable to
both continuous and discrete variables. When the outcome to be predicted
is continuous, this method is referred to as ”random forest regression.”
The above are a sample of techniques adapted from data science to a
wide array of prediction problems. Of these, random forest in particular
are an attractive alternative to fitting data using more established economic
techniques for four key reasons. First, random forest provides an extremely
high degree of predictive accuracy in most settings. Second, random forest
performs well given a very large number of binary indicators as predictors.
This is extremely useful and often overlooked in many practical applications
where only a few continuous predictors are available. Third, random forest
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is very robust to over-fitting and is only minimally affected by over-fitting
due to the internal cross-validation of the method. Fourth, random forest
regression allows for much greater flexibility than even many non-parametric
estimation techniques in common use today (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman
2009).
Random forest regression is also quite flexible. Methods adapting random
forest to quantile analysis (Meinshausen 2006) and to better asses causal-
ity (Lin and Jeon 2001, Blundell and Powell 2002) have been developed.
These advances suggest machine learning may be adaptable to a broad range
of econometric problems. They may even provide marked improvement in
cases where variables have highly non-linear behavior or strong, multi-level
interactions.
To date, there have been limited attempts to use data science methods to
predict demand in economics. Only a handful of notable examples have been
published. Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014) explore how machine
learning and data mining methodologies can be leveraged to build models in
economic topics. In particular they focus on the relative robustness of these
methods to over-fitting and their high performance in the face of a very large
number of predictors.
Bajari et al. (2015) combine random forest regression with many other
estimation techniques to get a weighted prediction of demand, building on a
suggestion first brought forward by Varian (2014). They found that combin-
ing models was helpful for predictive accuracy, but that the optimal weighting
scheme gave the vast majority of the overall predictive weight to the random
forest regression. This finding suggest the random forest methodology, by
itself, may provide excellent predictive accuracy.
3.1.1 Iowa Liquor Importation, Distribution, and Licensing
for Sale
This work focuses on the specific problem of predicting retailer demand for
liquor (exclusive of beer and wine) in the US state of Iowa. In Iowa, it
is illegal for any private business or person to import liquor from outside
the state for resale. Private businesses must acquire their stock from state
warehouses. Retailers in the state include liquor stores, convenience stores,
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and grocery stores. These retailers cover all levels of business size, from
multinational chains to local, single-location businesses. In all cases, it is
illegal to purchase liquor produced outside the borders of Iowa for resale.
There are 6 liquor distillers located within Iowa, but they collectively pro-
duce an extremely small volume of local brands, and by themselves cannot
support a strong, independent distribution operation. In practice this means
all liquor for most retailers comes from the state distributor.
The government of Iowa also sets the wholesale prices for liquor sold
through the state distributor. By law, the prices are set to a markup of
50% above the price paid by the state to manufacturers. Aside from split-
case fees and a few other special cases, the 50% markup holds consistently
across the data used here.
Iowa does not charge an additional sales tax on liquor as other states
do, but rather treats the 50% markup from the manufacturer’s price as a
liquor tax. Functionally, this leaves Iowa with relatively high taxes on liquor,
though the direct comparison with most state’s per-unit-volume taxes is dif-
ficult. Iowa’s 50% markup is larger than what would be expected of a private
wholesaler. However, compared to a hypothetical alternative scenario with
private distribution and a liquor-specific sales tax the overall cost to retailers
is equivalent or lower depending on assumptions of the relative size of the
liquor-specific sales tax (Iowa ABD 2009).
3.2 Data
The data used for this paper are derived from the Iowa Alcoholic Beverages
Divisions records of sales dating back to 2012. This dataset provides a com-
plete listing of all liquor sales to any Class E liquor license holder. A Class E
license is required to resell bottled liquors purchased from the state monopoly
distributor and importer in Iowa. This information includes the date of pur-
chase, volume of purchase, price paid, and a description and categorization
of every product. The data also include information on each license holder,
including the address and other key characteristics.
We take as our unit of analysis the demand for a particular liquor product
(referred to as a stock-keeping unit or SKU) of a particular store from the
state monopoly distributor in a given month. For their most frequently-
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ordered items, stores may have multiple orders in a given month, but for less
frequently-ordered products several months may elapse before repurchase.
Liquor has a long shelf-life and most producers tolerate somewhat old stock
on retailer shelves. The retailers themselves do not have a strong incentive
to keep stock very fresh for most liquor categories, as liquor is not subject to
spoilage (unlike beer).
There are over 2,000 individual products offered over the four years covered
by our data. Therefore, market fragmentation is high and for most products
demand is low. For the purposes of this exercise, we predict the demand
for just the top 17 products in the Iowa liquor market. These products
represent market leaders, with well over 0.5% overall market share within
the data. Restricting analysis to these products has twofold purpose: it
eases the computational burden of model estimation and it helps to minimize
the number of zero-demand edge-cases in the data3. Predictions are at the
retailer-product level 4.
The products under consideration are a variety of cases of whiskeys, vod-
kas, and rums. Only two bottles are less than one liter in volume. The total
share of the market covered by these products is 23%, and the largest SKU
in the market has a share of nearly 4.7% of total sales. A variety of national
and regional manufacturers are represented, including the largest liquor pro-
ducer in the United States, Diageo Americas. Product information is listed
in Table C.1 in the appendix.
3.3 Methodology
Our goal is to compare the predictive accuracy of random forest regression
and a more standard nested logit approach regarding total-volume demand
share and store-level demand share for each of the 18 products under consid-
eration. Estimates are compared on the mean squared error of prediction for
individual product demand across all stores. It is not initially obvious that
one methodology will be more accurate than another in a consistent fash-
3Though not technically a requirement for either of our models, MNL performs some-
what erratically when estimating very low probability cases as a result of its functional
form.
4Note that actual store sales and prices to consumers are masked, here we treat the
retailer as the demand-side and the monopoly distributor as the supply-side.
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ion, so we also investigate the distribution of errors. What follows are the
technical details of each estimation technique, with special emphasis placed
on random forest regression owing to its relative novelty in the economics
literature.
3.3.1 Random Forest Regression
Much of the following is adapted from Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman
(2009), but is re-framed from a more economic perspective. Much of the
original work was first put forth by Brieman (1984, 1996, 2001).
Random forest regression predictions are the average predictions of many
individual decision trees, so we begin by detailing the construction of a deci-
sion tree. Consider a dataset D which contains a set of potential explanatory
variables X and an outcome variable y which we would like to predict based
on some subset of X.5 Decision trees obtain estimates by partitioning D into
two subsets recursively until a predetermined stopping point is reached for
all subsets of D. The prediction for a particular set of values for the variables
in X is obtained by following the tree, using using those values to reach a
terminal node. The prediction itself is typically the average of all y values, ȳ,
in the subset of D allocated to the relevant terminal node, though medians
can also be used.
Specifically, the estimation proceeds in the following steps given D or a
particular subset of D, Di:
1. Iterate through all predictors xi ∈ X to find the optimal ”split point”




(ȳi1 − yk)2 +
∑
{yk|xik>si}
(ȳi2 − yk)2 (3.1)
for potential subsets ofDi,Di1 =
{




yj, xj|xij > si
}
.
This is simply the minimization of the sum of squares of the residuals
for each subset of a particular binary partition.6
5Potentially, the set of variables used in prediction may be exactly X, but this is not
necessarily the outcome of any particular decision tree.
6This algorithm is both greedy and exhaustive. In practice exhaustive search is not
used when X is large, but can still be used efficiently when X contains a categorical
variable with many levels.
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2. Construct the full tree (so each terminal node’s dataset has exactly one
observation).
3. ”Prune” the tree by determining which branches lead to sufficiently
large increases in predictive accuracy. Determine the improvement in
prediction given by a particular branch by comparing the gains in SSE
from partitioning Di into Di1, Di2, and all subsequent partitions. If
the improvement is above some predetermined value c (which can be
a function of features of D), keep the branch. This is referred to as
”cost-complexity” pruning.
4. Return the tree once all branches from all nodes generate SSE improve-
ment greater than or equal to c.
The algorithm is quite prescriptive. The only effect the researcher has on
the predictions of a particular decision tree is to choose the contents of D
and to set the cutoff threshold c. Individual decision trees suffer from certain
inherent problems that limit their application. They tend to overfit the data
or exhibit low predictive accuracy, depending on how ”deep” the tree is (i.e.
the relative magnitude of c) (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2009)).
To ameliorate these shortcomings, decision trees can be modified and ag-
gregated to obtain more accurate, robust predictions. This is accomplished
through ”bagging” (using many datasets bootstrapped from D to estimate
trees) and ”boosting” (combining the predictions of many individual trees
to generate the final prediction). To further reduce tree overfitting (and to
avoid a single strong predictor being over-used and potentially increasing
prediction variance), at each node for each tree a randomly selected subset
of all predictors is chosen for consideration. This method was first proposed
by Brieman (2001). The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Determine the number of trees to construct, T , and the number of
variables to try at each node of each tree, m.
2. Generate T bootstrap samples from D.
3. Construct a decision tree for each bootstrapped sample. For each indi-
vidual node in each tree, consider only m randomly selected variables.
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The final prediction for a given set of values for the explanatory variables
is obtained by taking a simple average of the predictions of each of the T
trees.
Random forest regression has several advantages over linear models. First
and foremost, random forest regression, by working from a decision tree
structure, is able to capture very complex variable relationships. In par-
ticular, trees are suited to capturing non-monotonicity and non-monotonic
interactions between explanatory variables. Random forests are also useful
for capturing non-linearities in a way that does not require extensive explo-
ration of complex functional forms.
For example, consider the interaction of year and month fixed effects to
generate time-specific fixed effects. In a random forest given only year and
month fixed effects, all interactions will automatically be considered (though,
importantly, not necessarily used in the model), given enough trees. At a
particular node where a year indicator is chosen, consider the subsequent
splitting decisions. The model will draw a random subset of all predictors to
consider, which may or may not contain month indicators. For any month
indicator selected as the splitting variable, the average of the dependent
variable in the subsequent partitions depends on the interaction between
year and the selected month by construction.
Though no guarantee a particular interaction is used in prediction can be
given, those interactions that are excluded are precisely those that are the
least useful predictively. This also serves to highlight the importance of aver-
aging predictions across many trees. Doing so gives many more possibilities
for complex, multi-leveled interactions to be used in prediction.
Similar logic holds for complex functional forms and non-monotonicities.
All possibilities are theoretically considered given enough trees in the forest,
but only those that improve SSE significantly will be used by the model.
Finally, random forests are usually automatically cross-validated, whereas
in linear regression cross-validation must be done manually. Most implemen-
tations of random forest algorithms use the ”out of bag” error rate as their
measure of improvement in SSE. The out of bag error rate is the error in the
prediction of points using only trees which were not constructed using that
point (so returning to our ”bagging” terminology, these points are literally
out of the bag). In the limit, this procedure is arbitrarily close to k-fold
cross-validation with k set equal to the total number of observations.
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Random forest regression also has several drawbacks. First, random forest
regression can be difficult to interpret. Any individual tree is quite easy to
analyze and observe, but a random forest-generated prediction is the product
of many such trees analyzed together. This means that a clean marginal
interpretation of coefficients is not possible; however, through simulation
and prediction point estimates of marginal effects can be recovered.
Second, random forests are not bound by constraints on functional form.
This flexibility is advantageous in some cases, but can result in unrealistic
predicted marginal effects in others. For example, price elasticity is not
bound to be constant or smooth through the price space.
Third, random forests tend to lose accuracy in cases where the true rela-
tionship between variables is simple and linear (Smith, Ganesh, & Liu 2013).
This has to do with the way random forests handle prediction on variable val-
ues between observed values. When data are sparse, many implementations
of the random forest method will never choose a split point that lies arbi-
trarily between two observed values: the split will always be at an observed
data point.
Consider a variable xj which can take on any value in [0, 1]. Suppose in our
dataset D we have no observations of xj between [0.4, 0.6], but otherwise we
have observations of xj evenly distributed throughout the rest of its range.
Furthermore suppose that in a particular tree, the optimal partition at a par-
ticular node with datasetDi happens to beDi1 = {y, x ∈ Di|xj < 0.4} , Di2 =
Di − Di1. In this case, the pair (xj, 0.4) is a solution to the minimiza-
tion of the function in (1). However, we can also infer (xj, 0.5) is a solu-
tion as well, because given the assumptions above {y, x ∈ Di|xj < 0.4} =
{y, x ∈ Di|xj < 0.5}.
This implies the prediction, which is purely a function of the contents of
Di1 will not change. Thus random forest predicts at most one step change
in y in response to changes in xj between xj values of 0.4 and 0.6. Even if
multiple split points are chosen (say the algorithm chooses randomly from all
possible SSE minima across trees and nodes) a step change will be predicted.
If the true relationship is linear and non-zero in slope, prediction error will
rise compared to the results obtained from a linear regression (or other linear
model).
This work explores how these relative strengths and weaknesses affect pre-
diction accuracy when applied to a complex demand system. If interactions
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and non-linearities are minimal in the true system, we would expect random
forest to perform relatively poorly. Likewise if these features are extensive
in the relationship between demand and our set of covariates, random forest
should provide significantly improved fit.
3.3.2 Nested Logit
For our more traditional econometric model we implement a hierarchical
Bayes nested multinomial mixed logit (HBNMML). Typically in empirical
applications the Berry Levinsohn Pakes (2004) model is preferred, but in this
setting we lack sufficient instruments. The characteristics of the products in
the liquor market are either literally categorical or functionally so (with the
notable exception of price). There are only a few standard bottle sizes and
alcohol concentrations, and these tend to be highly correlated with the type
of product itself. 7
Here our logit is estimated with utility functions for store i for product j
in month t of the form
Uijt = ASCij + βi ∗ pjt + ϵijt (3.2)
Where ASCij is a store-product specific utility constant, pjt is the price of
product j in month t (which is constant across all retailers in the state at all
times), and ϵijt is an IID error term from the standard type I extreme value
distribution.
For a given set of utility functions the probability of a particular choice has
a closed form solution, which is a result of the assumption on the distribution






This model is estimated using a hierarchical Bayesian approach, specif-
ically using Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) as implemented through
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain draws from the posterior distri-
bution. This method sets a distribution across i for the coefficients ASCij
7For example, most vodkas are 80-proof, or 40% alcohol by volume.
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and βi draws each retailer’s coefficient, estimates fit, and adjusts the dis-
tributions’ means and standard deviations to improve fit. Over the course
of many iterations the draws from the internally-calculated posterior distri-
butions converge to the actual posterior. This is functionally identical to a
mixed logit approach as described in Train (2001).
We take as our prior for the ASCij ∼ W−1(I, 16) and for βi, ln(−βi) ∼
N (0, 1). The lognormal prior on βi guarantees no store will have a positive
price coefficient.
After the draws converge to the posterior, we take as our estimated param-
eters the average over 1,000 draws. Predictions are obtained by estimating
the share of choice for each product using these averages taken at the retailer
level. Because of serial correlation induced by the sampling method, only
every 5th draw is retained for averaging purposes.
Mixed logit models are useful for breaking the IIA problem observed in
simple logit structures. The key difference here is the inclusion of a nested
logit structure as opposed to a simple logit structure. This makes the behav-
ior of the model for individual draws more realistic than a simple hierarchical
Bayes mixed logit without sacrificing computational tractability. 8 Strictly
speaking, the scale parameters are held constant across the population of
retailers. The data are not rich enough to permit an estimate of scale pa-
rameters that allows for individual-level heterogeneity.
We divide the various products into three nests: whiskey, vodka, and all
other products. This represents the typical categorization and organization
actually implemented by retailers. Most retailers organize their selections by
the type of liquid, and then within that categorization divide products by
relative price and quality (top-shelf and bottom-shelf, for example).
3.3.3 Variables and Structure
The variables used in the random forest include year and month indicators,
item-specific indicators, item-category indicators, item volume by both case
and bottle, item cost, item cost per milliliter, manufacturer indicators, re-
tailer square footage, and retailer type indicators.
8This stands in contrast to discrete-continuous models such as those proposed by Bhat
(2004), McFadden(1984), and Nair, Dube, & Chintagunta (2005) which are not computa-
tionally tractable in a hierarchical Bayes setting.
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We consider the same set of variables for the nested logit. However, we
do not include variables related to the retailer, as we are already fitting
individual-level coefficients using hierarchical Bayes MCMC. Each retailer
already receives individually-fit coefficients for price and product preference.
3.3.4 Method of Comparison
For this work, we compare the accuracy of the predictions of both the ran-
dom forest and the nested logit models on a holdout sample. The data are
structured differently by necessity for each model in such a way as to make
K-fold cross validation both tedious and impractical, so the holdout here is
composed of all observations for July 2013 and December 2014. This ensures
each model is being compared on accuracy on precisely identical datasets.
We compare volume share accuracy at several levels to better describe
the differences between model accuracy. Specifically, for a given month we
predict the overall demand share for each of the top 17 products individually
and each store’s individual demand share for each of the top 17 products. As
predictions become finer, the data become increasingly sparse, which gives
us a good indication of these approaches’ relative strengths and weaknesses.
Random forest regression is quite capable of predicting volume as well as
share of volume. For this work we estimate a random forest using volume as
the dependent variable, and then convert those predictions to volume share.
3.4 Results
We begin by discussing the predictive accuracy of the HBNMML model. The
means and standard deviations for the distributions of each coefficient are
listed in Table C.2.
Visual inspection of the traces for each parameter in the final estimated
model suggest convergence was achieved. Figures C.1 through C.4 demon-
strate the various convergence rates and variance across draws for model
parameters in the HBNMML model. Figure C.5 demonstrates that after 100
trees in the forest, the random forest volume model stops improving in ex-
planatory power. Figure C.6 tells us that store size and price are among the
more powerful predictors in our model.
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The predictive accuracies of the HBNMML model overall and by product
are reported in Table C.4. Mean absolute prediction error is 6.5%. There
is considerable variance by product, with the mean absolute prediction error
being largely proportional to the average market share of a given product.
However, when we explore the mean prediction errors by product we read-
ily observe few of the average values are near zero. Examining the distribu-
tion of errors in Figure C.7, we see this is not simply an issue of fat tails:
several of the distributions are quite biased.
When scaling the errors by overall market share (Figure C.9), the distri-
bution of errors shifts much closer to 0, but there are still products for which
overall predictions are not evenly distributed around 0.
Examining the distribution of errors by store square footage (Figure C.11)
and store type (Figure C.13) is encouraging. There are not large asymmetries
in any case (at least not ones that differ from the average errors.
By comparison, the random forest model (again using the same data) was
much more accurate (Table C.5). The median absolute prediction error in
the holdout sample was 2.0%, which is a slight improvement over the 2.3%
median absolute prediction error observed in the HBNMML model.
However, the random forest regression has a median prediction error of
-0.69%, which is well above the median of 0.03% in the HBNMML model.
Examining the distribution of errors, we again observe patterns of asym-
metry of prediction errors by product. Again, when scaling the observation
errors by the actual market shares we observe some products have non-zero
average errors (Figures C.8 and C.10).
When looking at accuracy by product we observe a strong positive relation-
ship between the magnitude of errors and the actual share to be predicted,
which we would expect. When scaled by actual shares, the distributions of
errors across products are much closer (see Figures C.3 and C.4).
We observe no appreciable differences in error sizes by store store square
footage. However, it appears that errors for convenience stores are slightly
more symmetric under the random forest model, whereas predictions for
pharmacies are slightly more dispersed.
45
3.4.1 Tax Counter-factual
One way to demonstrate the magnitude of the practical differences between
these two approaches is to apply them to a potential policy change. Iowa
has a unique tax structure in that it is a purely ad valorem markup on the
cost to the state distributor of acquiring products. Most states use instead
a per-volume tax on liquor.
We can estimate the predicted effects of such a change and its implied
effect on product demand and product market shares within Iowa. For the
random forest model this is quite straightforward, as we can predict volume
demanded directly. We calculate a replacement per-volume tax as 50% of
the average, by month, of the volume-weighted pre-tax prices of liquor sold
in Iowa in the data. This tax is $1.63 per 750mL bottle of liquor, regardless
of base price. Switching to this tax regime results in lower prices (sometimes
vastly lower) for more expensive products, while prices for cheaper products
tend to rise.
We find that the expected revenue to the state from these top products
falls by 58%. This is driven by a substitution from cheaper products to more
expensive ones. Revenue falls due to the lower demand for products that
experienced a tax increase, and higher demand for products that experienced
a tax decrease. There is a small, negative effect on the total volume sold (a
decline of 0.03%). We find a substitution away from products that increased
in price, and a substitution toward products that decreased in price due to
the new tax regime.
For the HBNMML, we are only able to predict share (as opposed to the
direct prediction of volume with the random forest) and thus require an
outside estimate of the volume change resulting from any change in price.
Our estimates normalize all shares to sum to one for both models, with no
outside good introduced into the model. To estimate a change in tax revenue
we require a prediction of overall volume change in the market. For the
HBNMML we use an outside estimate of price elasticity of demand for liquor.
A meta-analysis of liquor demand conducted by Nelson (2013) returned an
estimated overall elasticity of demand for liquor of -0.55, and we use this
as our scaling factor for demand response to a given percentage change in
volume-weighted prices for liquor. We then estimate the revenue effects of
a different tax regime. For completeness and comparability we also repeat
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the exercise with an estimate of price elasticity of demand for liquor derived
from the random forest model (-0.84).
We find similar effects in the HBNMML. Overall state tax revenue falls by
52%, driven by similar substitution patterns as those observed in the random
forest model. We find a small increase in demand in this model, as opposed
to the near-zero impact in the random forest specification (an overall .3%
increase). Using the alternate measure of price elasticity gives a very similar
result. This is not surprising, as the tax counterfactual was designed to keep
overall prices comparable across scenarios. The net price change on average
is quite small between the two scenarios.
The specific results for individual products diverge considerably. The rev-
enue impacts estimated by the random forest are broadly negative on a per-
product basis, while for the HBNMML model revenue impacts vary consid-
erably. This large discrepancy is driven by differing estimates for volume.
These results suggest the unique tax structure of Iowa’s liquor market
results in much higher revenues for the state than the per-volume taxes ap-
plied in most other states. That we find negligible effects on total volume
sold further suggest these higher revenues are structured in a progressive way.
Drinkers of more expensive liquor are paying a disproportionately high share
of the overall tax when compared to a per-volume tax structure. Depending
on one’s perspective this is an under-appreciated virtue of ad valorem taxes
as opposed to per-volume taxes.
This exercise suggests differences in counter-factual estimation are small
at the aggregate level. Either model will deliver broadly similar results. The
random forest model has been shown to be somewhat better predictively, but
the literature has established the strong flexibility of MNL-based models in
the face of econometric issues such as endogeneity. The particular circum-
stances surrounding the predictive question a researcher faces will ultimately
dictate methodology, but this exercise shows the viability of random forest
as an alternative to more traditional techniques.
If policymakers are concerned with the effects of a tax change on individ-
ual product volumes and revenues, then the choice of estimation technique
becomes very important. This discrepancy could likely be resolved through
the use of an effective instrument for prices.
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3.4.2 Comparison with LASSO
We also compare results to the widely-implemented LASSO method. LASSO
is well-suited to situations calling for a very high number of model parame-
ters.
LASSO regression applies a penalty to model complexity by reducing the
magnitude of coefficients by a function of a penalty parameter λ. Less-
informative parameters are reduced to zero more quickly, while more impor-
tant parameter coefficients are adjusted more slowly. In this way, LASSO
is able to handle models with large numbers of parameters. We estimate a
LASSO model with a Gaussian link function, with the share of choice serv-
ing as the dependent variable (as with the random forest model above). We
estimate a 10-fold cross-validated LASSO model using the variables used for
the other two methods. We also allow the model to use all product-level
interactions of all variables. This provided a small improvement in overall fit
compared to a LASSO that does not include interaction terms. Figure C.7
displays the improvement in MSE in the cross-validated model estimated as
the shrinkage parameter becomes less restrictive. We observe that the op-
timal fit includes all variables, but the most regularized model within one
standard deviation of the MSE of the optimal fit only includes about half
the parameters.
We can also estimate an elastic net with various levels of the mixing param-
eter α. We find very little variation in minimum MSE in the cross-validated
estimates when varying α, and more parsimonious models are favored as
alpha approaches one (the LASSO case).
Using the predictions from the best regularized model within one standard
deviation of accuracy of the cross-validated optimal fit, we find the LASSO
performs well compared to the HBNMNL model, but poorly compared to the
random forest. The MSE for the LASSO regression is 1.0% , compared to
1.3% for the HBNMML model and 0.8% for the random forest. This is not
unexpected, as the penalty applied in LASSO assigns a higher importance
to variables with a stronger predictive signal, and is thus able to better sort
through a high number of parameters than more parametric models. When
examining the most significant coefficients we find price is the key variable,
and overall MSE is not impacted by functional form.
These results are presented below in Table C.5. We readily observe that the
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LASSO seems to slightly outperform the HBNMML model, but still under-
performs the random forest model somewhat. We do note that generally
the mean prediction errors for the LASSO by product are smaller than the
other models for most products. Figures C.10 and C.13 demonstrate that the
LASSO seems to have large negative errors and small positive errors when
compared to the other two models, but is otherwise comparable in terms of
predictive accuracy. Figure C.19 demonstrates that there is a general pattern
of a large number of small over-estimations of share and a few very negative
errors across store types. We observe this pattern is most severe in liquor
stores.
These results reinforce the conclusion that the random forest regression
delivers very high predictive accuracy compared to other methods that are
able to leverage high degrees of interaction between variables.
3.4.3 Restricting Scope of Random Forest Trees
Random forest models implicitly allow for the inclusion of all possible variable
interactions. Indeed, this is understood to be one of the chief advantages of
the technique. Consideration of potentially thousands of additional variables
allows the estimate to explore a very large part of the potential model space
for a relatively low computational cost.
One can reasonably claim that the increased predictive performance of the
random forest model relative to that of the multinomial logit is in large part
due to this feature as opposed to capturing non-linearities or the bootstrap-
ping procedure.
We can investigate the relative improvement in predictive accuracy due
to the implicit consideration of these interaction terms by comparing the
performance of a full random forest to one forced to consider a more limited
set of interaction terms. This is accomplished by restricting the number of
nodes estimated for each bootstrapped tree in the forest. Each division of the
data at each node generates a new term being used by the estimate, 9 which
is similar to the operation of a binary variable in a linear model. Therefore
the number of nodes in each tree can be considered logically equivalent to
the number of variables included in that tree.
9It should be noted that in all but the initial node split this is potentially a binary
variable interacted with all binary variables of all parent nodes.
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For our purposes we restrict the number of terminal nodes to 21, which
leaves the tree with 20 splits. This gives us the 20 variables used in the
HBNMML model (16 alternative specific constants, one price term, and three
scale terms). Otherwise, our estimate of the restricted forest uses data,
estimation parameters, and a holdout procedure identical to the main model.
We find a marked decrease in predictive accuracy, which implies a very
large part of the predictive power of the random forest model in this particu-
lar case derives from the ability to capture numerous interaction terms. The
restricted random forest model has a MSE of 1.1%, which is only marginally
better than the HBNMMLMSE of 1.3% and is slightly worse than the LASSO
MSE of 1.0% (Table C.8). Figures C.20 and C.21 display the product level er-
rors for the restricted random forest model. We can readily observe generally
large errors compared to the main random forest model.
We can conclude that a large portion, perhaps the majority, of the im-
provement in accuracy of the random forest model is due to its ability to
incorporate a huge number of interaction variables.
3.5 Discussion
Random forest regression is a new technique to economics, but is well-
established in many other disciplines. Modern computers have made it pos-
sible to estimate these models quickly, and have opened new possibilities for
empirical economics.
Random forest regression is well-suited to applications where nonlineari-
ties, non-monotonicities and complex interactions are expected. Addition-
ally, in many empirical settings the predictive accuracy of the random forest
method is quite high.
Demand analysis, in particular, is a historically difficult problem for em-
pirical work. Many regressors are discrete, and data are often sparse. Fur-
thermore, strong assumptions of linearity are generally required, and it is
entirely possible that relaxing those assumptions would lead to improved fit.
We have demonstrated in this paper the potential for machine learning
methods, particularly random forest regression, to improve the predictive fit
of models as applied to demand analysis. Even with a relatively sophisticated
discrete choice model, which leveraged a nest structure over the products
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and utilized individual heterogeneity through mixed logit, a simple random
forest regression vastly improved predictive fit. This was present at all levels
of analysis.
However, the random forest model had errors that were not evenly dis-
tributed around 0 at less aggregated levels (such as product level), which is
cause for some concern. A more sophisticated approach to applying machine
learning may lead to an improvement of this issue.
Future work should be concerned with other implications derived from the
use of random forest regression in demand analysis. Of particular interest is
the applicability of random forest regression to estimate the effects of other-
wise endogenous regressors. Causality derived from random forest regression
remains an open topic, though Varian (2013) has suggested a path forward
by leveraging the method’s relatively high predictive accuracy. Addition-
ally, certain elements of the technique suggest a high degree of difficulty in
estimating elasticities of demand, in particular.
Regardless, machine learning methods, including random forest regression,
demonstrate excellent predictive accuracy and can capture complex non-
linear interactions between variables. Many of the potential shortcomings
of these techniques when applied to economics still need to be assessed, this
work suggests random forest regression is worth further investigation.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING MATERIAL
FOR CHAPTER 1
Table 1: Iowa Liquor License Annual Fee Schedule
Population Under 1500 Sq. Ft. 1501-2000 Sq. Ft. 2001-5000 Sq. Ft More than 5000 Sq. Ft.
Under 1501 $750 $1500 $2500 $3500
1501-10000 $1500 $2500 $3500 $5000
More than 10000 $2500 $3500 $5000 $7500
Source: Iowa ABD (https://abd.iowa.gov/fee-schedule)
Table 2: Iowa Liquor License Annual Fee Schedule: Premises Selling
Gasoline
Population Under 1500 Sq. Ft. 1501-2000 Sq. Ft. 2001-5000 Sq. Ft More than 5000 Sq. Ft.
Under 1501 $3500 $3500 $3500 $3500
1501-10000 $5000 $5000 $5000 $5000
More than 10000 $5000 $5000 $5000 $7500
Source: Iowa ABD (https://abd.iowa.gov/fee-schedule)
Table 3: Iowa City Counts by Population Band






Source: 2010 United States Census
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Table 4: Kernel Bandwidths by Margin
Margin Population < 1500 Bandwidth Population ≥ 1500 Bandwidth
Store Count 99 185
Volume 112 80
Operation Time 91 264
Average Cost 91 125
Item Variety 113 137
Volume Per Store 115 95
57
Table 5: Des Moines Suburbs Under 10,000 Population













Dallas Center 1623 0
Dawson 131 0
De Soto 1050 2
Dexter 611 0
Earlham 1450 1



















Pleasant Hill 8785 3






Spring Hill 63 0
St. Charles 653 1




Van Meter 1016 1





Table 6: Quantiles for Bootstrap Estimates for Local Polynomial
Regressions
Quantile Population 0.025 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.975
Store Count 1499 0.82 0.89 1.32 1.96 2.1
1500 1.26 1.32 1.71 2.13 2.21
Volume 1499 4657 6536 17172 33598 37564
1500 22543 25747 53265 93109 96816
Operation Time 1499 952 1066 1557 2180 2407
1500 1387 1484 2044 2509 2577
Average Cost 1499 11.67 11.92 12.95 14.12 14.37
1500 11.74 11.99 13 13.73 13.84
Item Variety 1499 50 65 155 289 323
1500 170 204 347 454 472
Volume Per Store 1499 4921 7010 12066 17313 18467
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING MATERIAL
FOR CHAPTER 2
Table 16: Pre-First Stage
Dependent variable:
Establishment Decision to Order
Probit OLS
(1) (2)
Order share of 3.407∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗







Akaike Inf. Crit. 805,731.100
Residual Std. Error 0.310 (df = 1269484)
F Statistic 1,740,729∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1269484)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 17: First Stage
Dependent variable:






















Residual Std. Error 1.302 (df = 467524)
F Statistic 2.02∗1006∗∗∗ (df = 8; 467524)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 18: Main Results Pooled Across Products




State Cost 2.24∗10−02∗∗∗ 8.09∗10−03∗∗∗
(3.89∗10−04) (1.37∗10−04)
Bottle Volume −3.79∗10−04∗∗∗ −1.38∗10−04∗∗∗
(4.42∗10−06) (1.54∗10−06)
Convenience Store 7.65∗10−02∗∗∗ 3.11∗10−02∗∗∗
(1.02∗10−02) (3.51∗10−03)
Grocery Store 9.52∗10−02∗∗∗ 3.78∗10−02∗∗∗
(1.01∗10−02) (3.52∗10−03)
Liquor Store 4.58∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.72∗10−01∗∗∗
(9.45∗10−03) (3.29∗10−03)
Sells Gasoline −4.09∗10−01∗∗∗ −1.30∗10−01∗∗∗
(6.49∗10−03) (2.16∗10−03)
Stores In City -1.63∗10−02∗∗∗ −5.21∗10−03∗∗∗
(1.34∗10−04) (4.14∗10−05)
Store Square Footage −4.12∗10−07∗∗∗ −1.50∗10−07∗∗∗
(7.86∗10−08) (2.73∗10−08)
Own City Ordered 6.03∗10−02∗∗∗ 1.99∗10−02∗∗∗
(4.26∗10−04) (1.33∗10−04)
Observations 467,523 467,523
Residual Std. Error 0.450 (df = 467,233)
Wald Test 6,375 (p < 2.2∗10−16)
Hit Rate 0.659 0.658
Marginal Effect 2.12∗10−02∗∗∗ 1.99∗10−02∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 19: Product-Level Marginal Effects by Model
IV Probit 2SLS
5th Percentile -6.83% -6.30%
50th Percentile -0.15 -0.26




Table 20: Marginal Effects and Hit Rates for Top Products
Product Sales Marginal Hit Marginal Hit
in Liters Effect Rate Effect Rate
Black Velvet 1750 mL 3590199 0.39 80.7 0.50 75.8
Hawkeye Vodka 1750 mL 2357611 -0.61 78.4 -0.61 73.4
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 1000 mL 1370361 -0.99 73.0 -0.95 68.8
Five O’clock Vodka 1750 mL 1087293 0.72 73.3 0.91 65.2
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 1750 mL 797997 -2.19 66.2 -2.23 57.5
Phillips Vodka 1750 mL 787131 0.32 62.0 0.33 61.3
Barton Vodka 1000 mL 773136 -0.68 69.2 -9.64 69.8
Hawkeye Vodka 750 mL 747289 -0.28 73.3 -0.28 59.9
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 1000 mL 705988 -6.31 72.0 -6.37 71.5
Canadian Ltd Whisky 1750 mL 663373 -3.54 74.7 -3.77 70.2
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 1000 mL 654949 -4.01 74.2 -4.04 73.8
Barton Vodka 1750 mL 647112 1.16 64.0 1.20 57.1
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 1750 mL 605581 -2.24 69.8 -2.28 69.2
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 1750 mL 601839 0.76 65.9 0.76 59.3
Black Velvet 1000 mL 600791 -0.34 71.7 -0.31 67.0
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 1000 mL 582649 -6.33 67.2 -5.88 60.3
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 750 mL 562187 -0.01 73.2 -0.00 61.9
Captain Morgan Spiced Barrel 1750 mL 490163 2.65 78.6 1.71 78.6
Jose Cuervo Authentic Lime Margarita 1750 mL 487391 -1.55 69.9 -1.63 54.9
Paramount White Rum 1750 mL 484269 0.92 64.5 0.96 51.2
Black Velvet 750 mL 475397 0.31 66.4 0.29 53.3
Smirnoff Vodka 80 Prf Pet 1750 mL 473211 0.35 69.6 0.37 63.9
Juarez Tequila Gold 1000 mL 468607 -4.33 71.1 -3.89 71.6
Phillips Vodka 1000 mL 463877 -1.22 75.9 -1.71 79.0
Mccormick Vodka Pet 1750 mL 459251 -8.66 55.1 -8.71 51.2
Hawkeye Vodka 1000 mL 454575 -3.24 65.0 -3.31 53.6
Bacardi Superior Rum 1750 mL 440661 0.16 65.5 0.20 48.4
Windsor Canadian Pet 1750 mL 440167 -1.01 69.8 -1.09 61.8
Nikolai Vodka 1750 mL 433892 2.27 75.6 2.28 75.6
Jagermeister Liqueur 1000 mL 431020 -3.30 72.5 -3.38 72.0
Skol Vodka 1750 mL 408476 -2.46 65.5 -2.37 62.8
Crown Royal 750 mL 405115 0.19 81.4 0.14 82.0
Absolut Swedish Vodka 80 Prf 1000 mL 397197 -1.35 75.3 -1.97 71.9
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 750 mL 395106 1.16 62.5 1.05 52.0
Average 727760 -1.86 70.4 -1.87 64.9
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Table 21: Confusion Matrices for Models
IV Probit
Actual
Ordered Not Ordered Total
Prediction
Ordered 84,810 105,728 190,538
Not Ordered 53,931 223,064 276,995
Total 138,714 328,792 467,533
2SLS
Actual
Ordered Not Ordered Total
Prediction
Ordered 83,986 106,552 190,538
Not Ordered 53,233 223,762 276,995
Total 137,219 330,314 467,533
Table 22: Confusion Matrices for Models: Confident Predictions
IV Probit
Actual
Ordered Not Ordered Total
Prediction
Ordered 5,129 7,815 12,944
Not Ordered 1,368 52,044 53,412
Total 6,497 59,859 66,356
2SLS
Actual
Ordered Not Ordered Total
Prediction
Ordered 4,623 6,583 11,206
Not Ordered 1,219 46,659 54,461
Total 5,842 53,242 65,667
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Table 23: Cross-Definition Correlations in Product Level Marginal Effects
IV Probit 3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months
3 Months 1 0.91 0.57 0.67
6 Months 1 0.80 0.82
9 Months 1 0.75
12 Months 1
2SLS 3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months
3 Months 1 0.85 0.53 0.55
6 Months 1 0.84 0.78
9 Months 1 0.80
12 Months 1
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Table 24: Heterogeneity Across Market Size
Dependent variable: Establishment Decision to Order
IV Probit 2SLS
Small Mkt. Large Mkt. Small Mkt. Large Mkt.
Constant −4.99∗10−01∗∗∗ −4.90∗10−02∗∗∗ 3.12∗10−01∗∗∗ 4.71∗10−01∗∗∗
(2.33∗10−02) (1.23∗10−02) (8.39∗10−03) (4.18∗10−03)
State Cost 2.72∗10−02∗∗∗ 2.01∗10−02∗∗∗ 9.94∗10−03∗∗∗ 7.04∗10−03∗∗∗
(7.12∗10−04) (4.70∗10−04) (2.58∗10−04) (1.59∗10−04)
Bottle Volume −1.98∗10−04∗∗∗ −4.40∗10−04∗∗∗ −7.21∗10−05∗∗∗ −1.57∗10−04∗∗∗
(8.06∗10−06) (5.34∗10−06) (5.34∗10−06) (1.80∗10−06)
Convenience St. −1.99∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.07∗10−01∗∗∗ −6.30∗10−02∗∗∗ 4.08∗10−02∗∗∗
(2.39∗10−02) (1.16∗10−02) (8.42∗10−03) (3.89∗10−03)
Grocery Store 2.07∗10−01∗∗∗ −2.86∗10−02∗ 7.43∗10−02∗∗∗ −1.60∗10−03∗∗∗
(2.00∗10−02) (1.28∗10−02) (7.19∗10−03) (4.30∗10−03)
Liquor Store 4.11∗10−01∗∗∗ 4.72∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.54∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.74∗10−01∗∗∗
(1.87∗10−02) (1.11∗10−02) (6.69∗10−03) (3.75∗10−03)
Sells Gasoline −4.06∗10−01∗∗∗ −4.25∗10−01∗∗∗ −1.28∗10−01∗∗∗ −1.34∗10−01∗∗∗
(2.02∗10−02) (6.93∗10−03) (6.79∗10−03) (2.26∗10−03)
Stores In City −8.27∗10−02∗∗∗ −1.64∗10−02∗∗∗ −3.01∗10−02∗∗∗ −5.26∗10−03∗∗∗
(4.98∗10−03) (1.42∗10−04) (1.80∗10−03) (4.32∗10−05)
Store Sq. Ft. 8.05∗10−06∗∗∗ −3.97∗10−07∗∗∗ 3.04∗10−06∗∗∗ −1.53∗10−07∗∗∗
(6.26∗10−07) (8.16∗10−08) (2.30∗10−07) (2.76∗10−08)
Own City Ordered 5.09∗10−02∗∗∗ 5.82∗10−02∗∗∗ 1.86∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.93∗10−02∗∗∗
(7.43∗10−03) (4.25∗10−04) (2.63∗10−03) (1.31∗10−04)
Observations 137,565 329,948 137,565 329,948
Residual Std. Error 0.473 0.452
Wald Test 1,472 6,082
Hit Rate 0.636 0.683 0.636 0.681
Marginal Effect 1.83∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.98∗10−02∗∗∗ 1.86∗10−01∗∗∗ 1.93∗10−02∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
90




Average Price 0.002 0.00000
(0.002) (0.0004)
375 mL Bottle 0.125 0.043∗∗
(0.101) (0.021)
750 mL Bottle 0.173∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.020)
1000 mL Bottle 0.061 0.028
(0.095) (0.020)
1750 mL Bottle 0.122 0.045∗∗
(0.095) (0.020)










Other Liquors 0.040 0.006
(0.026) (0.005)






Adjusted R2 0.123 0.178
Residual Std. Error (df = 191) 0.129 0.027
F Statistic (df = 12; 191) 3.378∗∗∗ 4.661∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 26: Regression of γ Excluding High Purchase Ratio Products
















Figure 36: 3-Month Marginal Effects
95
Figure 37: 9-Month Marginal Effects
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING MATERIAL
FOR CHAPTER 3
Table 27: Top Liquors in Iowa
Product Name Bottles/Case Bottle Vol. Category Manufacturer Total Sales (L)
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6 1750 Spiced Rum Heaven Hill 601,839
Barton Vodka 12 1000 Vodka 80 Proof Sazerac 773,136
Barton Vodka 6 1750 Vodka 80 Proof Sazerac 647,112
Black Velvet 12 1000 Canadian Whiskies Constellation 600,791
Black Velvet 6 1750 Canadian Whiskies Constellation 3,590,199
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6 1750 Canadian Whiskies Sazerac 663,373
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12 750 Spiced Rum Diageo Americas 562,187
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12 1000 Spiced Rum Diageo Americas 1,370,361
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6 1750 Spiced Rum Diageo Americas 797,997
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12 1000 Canadian Whiskies Diageo Americas 654,949
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12 1000 Whiskey Liqueur Sazerac Co., Inc. 582,649
Five O’clock Vodka 6 1750 Vodka 80 Proof Laird & Co. 1,087,293
Hawkeye Vodka 12 750 Vodka 80 Proof Luxco-St Louis 747,289
Hawkeye Vodka 6 1750 Vodka 80 Proof Luxco-St Louis 2,357,611
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12 1000 Tennessee Whiskies Brown-Forman 705,988
Phillips Vodka 6 1750 Vodka 80 Proof Phillips Beverage 787,131
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6 1750 Blended Whiskies Diageo Americas 605,581




















LAMBDA 1 0.44 0.01
LAMBDA 2 0.24 0.01
LAMBDA 3 0.73 0.01
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Table 29: Random Forest Regression Error by Product
Product Mean Share Mean Pred. Share Mean Pred. Err. Mean Abs. Pred. Error MSE
Black Velvet 12x1000mL 3.1% 3.2% -0.1% 3.0% 0.4%
Black Velvet 6x1750mL 19.3 24.3 -4.9 14.0 3.2
Barton Vodka 12x1000mL 1.4 1.9 -0.5 1.6 0.2
Barton Vodka 6x1750mL 3.1 2.4 0.6 2.8 0.5
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 3.6 3.9 -0.4 3.8 0.4
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12x1000mL 1.7 1.9 -0.2 1.3 0.1
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6x1750mL 3.8 4.2 -0.4 4.0 0.4
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6x1750mL 3.4 3.0 0.3 2.8 0.3
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12x1000mL 2.0 2.1 -0.1 1.6 0.1
Five O’clock Vodka 6x1750mL 11.1 9.4 1.8 8.8 2.0
Hawkeye Vodka 12x750mL 9.7 7.9 1.8 6.9 1.5
Hawkeye Vodka 6x1750mL 15.5 15.0 0.5 10.0 1.9
Phillips Vodka 6x1750mL 2.7 2.8 -0.2 2.6 0.2
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12x750mL 8.9 6.0 2.9 6.8 1.9
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12x1000mL 4.4 5.2 -0.9 3.9 0.4
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 4.7 4.7 0.0 4.9 0.6
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12x1000mL 1.4 1.7 -0.3 1.5 0.1
Total 5.9 5.9 0.0 4.7 0.8
Table 30: HBNMML Error by Product
Product Mean Share Mean Pred. Share Mean Pred. Err. Mean Abs. Pred. Error MSE
Black Velvet 12x1000mL 3.1% 3.2% -2.0% 3.7% 0.7%
Black Velvet 6x1750mL 19.3 24.3 4.1 16.2 3.9
Barton Vodka 12x1000mL 1.4 1.9 -1.2 1.5 0.3
Barton Vodka 6x1750mL 3.1 2.4 -2.2 3.5 0.8
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 3.6 3.9 -0.4 4.3 0.5
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12x1000mL 1.7 1.9 -1.1 2.1 0.2
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6x1750mL 3.8 4.2 -2.2 4.3 0.7
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6x1750mL 3.4 3.0 -1.6 3.7 0.4
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12x1000mL 2.0 2.1 -1.4 2.4 0.3
Five O’clock Vodka 6x1750mL 11.1 9.4 -2.2 11.2 3.2
Hawkeye Vodka 12x750mL 9.7 7.9 3.8 12.1 2.7
Hawkeye Vodka 6x1750mL 15.5 15.0 0.7 13.1 2.8
Phillips Vodka 6x1750mL 2.7 2.8 -2.1 2.9 0.5
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12x750mL 8.9 6.0 10.8 15.9 3.7
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12x1000mL 4.4 5.2 -3.2 4.9 0.9
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 4.7 4.7 1.7 6.5 0.8
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12x1000mL 1.4 1.7 -1.1 1.6 0.2
Total 5.9 5.9 0.0 6.5 1.3
Table 31: LASSO Error by Product
Product Mean Share Mean Pred. Share Mean Pred. Err. Mean Abs. Pred. Error MSE
Black Velvet 12x1000mL 3.1% 2.9% -0.2% 3.7% 0.5%
Black Velvet 6x1750mL 19.3 21.9 2.6 14.4 3.2
Barton Vodka 12x1000mL 1.4 1.3 -0.1 2.1 0.3
Barton Vodka 6x1750mL 3.1 3.0 -0.1 4.4 0.7
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 3.6 3.8 0.2 4.2 0.5
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12x1000mL 1.7 1.7 0.0 2.1 0.2
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6x1750mL 3.8 3.8 0.0 4.7 0.5
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6x1750mL 3.4 3.4 0.1 3.4 0.3
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12x1000mL 2.0 1.8 -0.2 2.3 0.2
Five O’clock Vodka 6x1750mL 11.1 10.8 -0.3 11.6 2.7
Hawkeye Vodka 12x750mL 9.7 9.5 -0.1 9.1 1.8
Hawkeye Vodka 6x1750mL 15.5 15.1 -0.4 12.2 2.4
Phillips Vodka 6x1750mL 2.7 3.1 0.4 3.6 0.3
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12x750mL 8.9 7.9 -1.0 8.0 1.9
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12x1000mL 4.4 4.0 -0.4 4.8 0.6
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 4.7 4.6 -0.1 5.6 0.6
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12x1000mL 1.4 1.2 -0.2 1.9 0.2
Total 5.9 5.9 0.0 5.8 1.0
Table 32: Tax Counterfactual
Product Revenue Change Random Forest Revenue Change HBNMML
Black Velvet 12x1000mL -50% -7%
Black Velvet 6x1750mL -57 13
Barton Vodka 12x1000mL -20 51
Barton Vodka 6x1750mL -19 57
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6x1750mL -50 -1
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12x1000mL -80 -53
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6x1750mL -34 29
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6x1750mL -51 0
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12x1000mL -79 -51
Five O’clock Vodka 6x1750mL -30 57
Hawkeye Vodka 12x750mL -27 48
Hawkeye Vodka 6x1750mL -31 57
Phillips Vodka 6x1750mL -25 49
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12x750mL -68 -44
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12x1000mL -71 -39
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6x1750mL -63 -29
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12x1000mL -76 -39
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Table 33: Product Codes
Product Item Code
Black Velvet 12x1000mL 11777685
Black Velvet 6x1750mL 11788689
Barton Vodka 12x1000mL 35317555
Barton Vodka 6x1750mL 35318559
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 43028216
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12x1000mL 112971485
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6x1750mL 124081067
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6x1750mL 256084476
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12x1000mL 268272787
Five O’clock Vodka 6x1750mL 359182079
Hawkeye Vodka 12x750mL 363052474
Hawkeye Vodka 6x1750mL 363082477
Phillips Vodka 6x1750mL 373484017
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12x750mL 433361110
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12x1000mL 433371133
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 433381135
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12x1000mL 648672039
Table 34: Restricted Random Forest Regression Error by Product
Product Mean Share Mean Pred. Share Mean Pred. Err. Mean Abs. Pred. Error MSE
Black Velvet 12x1000mL 3.1% 4.2% -1.1% 4.8% 0.6%
Black Velvet 6x1750mL 19.3 23.1 -3.7 14.8 3.4
Barton Vodka 12x1000mL 1.4 4.2 -2.8 4.5 0.4
Barton Vodka 6x1750mL 3.1 4.3 -1.1 5.2 0.7
Admiral Nelson Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 3.6 4.0 -0.4 4.4 0.5
Crown Royal Canadian Whisky 12x1000mL 1.7 3.8 -2.1 3.6 0.2
Canadian Ltd Whisky 6x1750mL 3.8 4.2 -0.3 5.0 0.6
Seagrams 7 Crown Bl Whiskey 6x1750mL 3.4 3.9 -0.6 4.0 0.3
Jack Daniels Old #7 Black Lbl 12x1000mL 2.0 3.8 -1.8 3.7 0.2
Five O’clock Vodka 6x1750mL 11.1 5.0 6.1 10.7 3.1
Hawkeye Vodka 12x750mL 9.7 6.6 3.1 9.0 2.0
Hawkeye Vodka 6x1750mL 15.5 11.3 4.2 12.2 2.6
Phillips Vodka 6x1750mL 2.7 4.4 -1.8 4.8 0.4
Captain Morgan Original Spiced 12x750mL 8.9 4.5 4.4 8.1 2.3
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 12x1000mL 4.4 4.5 -0.2 5.6 0.7
Captain Morgan Spiced Rum 6x1750mL 4.7 4.1 0.7 5.5 0.7
Fireball Cinnamon Whiskey 12x1000mL 1.4 3.9 -2.5 3.9 0.2
Total 5.9 5.9 0.0 6.5 1.1
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